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Abstract 
 
 
Amidst mounting federal debt, slowing the growth of health care spending is one 
of the nation’s top domestic priorities. This dissertation evaluates three current policy 
ideas: (1) global payment within an accountable care contracting model, (2) physician fee 
cuts, and (3) expanding the role of competitive bidding in Medicare. 
Chapter one studies the effect of global payment and pay-for-performance on 
health care spending and quality in accountable care organizations. I evaluate the Blue 
Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts Alternative Quality Contract (AQC), which was 
implemented in 2009 with seven provider organizations comprising 380,000 enrollees. 
Using claims and quality data in a quasi-experimental difference-in-differences design, I 
find that the AQC was associated with a 1.9 percent reduction in medical spending and 
modest improvements in quality of chronic care management and pediatric care in year 
one.  
Chapter two studies Medicare’s elimination of payments for consultations in the 
2010 Medicare Physician Fee Schedule. This targeted fee cut (largely to specialists) was 
accompanied by a fee increase for office visits (billed more often by primary care 
physicians). Using claims data for 2.2 million Medicare beneficiaries, I test for 
discontinuities in spending, volume, and coding of outpatient physician encounters with 
an interrupted time series design. I find that spending on physician encounters increased 6 
iv 
 
percent after the policy, largely due to a coding effect and higher office visit fees. 
Slightly more than half of the increase was accounted for by primary care physician 
visits, with the rest by specialist visits. 
Chapter three examines competitive bidding, which is at the center of several 
proposals to reform Medicare into a premium support program. In competitive bidding, 
private plans submit prices (bids) they are willing to accept to insure a Medicare 
beneficiary. In perfect competition, plans bid costs and thus bids are insensitive to the 
benchmark. Under imperfect competition, bids may move with the benchmark. I study 
the effect of benchmark changes on plan bids using Medicare Advantage data in a 
longitudinal market-level model. I find that a $1 increase in the benchmark leads to about 
a $0.50 increase in bids among Medicare managed care plans.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Effect of the Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts Alternative 
Quality Contract on health care spending and quality* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* A version of this chapter was previously published as the following: 
Zirui Song, Dana G. Safran, Bruce E. Landon, Yulei He, Randall P. Ellis, Robert E. 
Mechanic, Matthew P. Day, and Michael E. Chernew, “Health Care Spending and 
Quality in Year 1 of the Alternative Quality Contract,” New England Journal of 
Medicine. 2011 Sept 8;365(10):909-18. Epub 2011 July 13. 
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1.1. Introduction 
 
The growth of health care spending is a major concern for households, businesses, 
and state and federal policymakers.
1-3
 In response to continued spending growth in 
Massachusetts following health care reform, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts 
(BCBS), the state’s largest commercial payer, implemented the Alternative Quality 
Contract (AQC) in January of 2009.
4
 The AQC is a contracting model based on global 
payment and pay-for-performance. It is similar to the two-sided accountable care 
organization (ACO) model specified by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS) in its proposed ACO regulations.
5
 
Global payment has received attention as an alternate financing mechanism to 
fee-for-service (FFS) because of its ability to control total spending.
6-7
 In July of 2009, a 
Massachusetts state commission voted unanimously to move the state towards global 
payment within 5 years.
8
 In contrast to a one-sided, “shared savings” model in which 
providers do not bear risk, providers in a global payment model share in savings if 
spending is below a pre-specified budget, but are also accountable for deficits if spending 
exceeds the budget.
 9-11
 This “downside” risk is a stronger tool for spending control.12-14  
BCBS implemented the AQC in its health maintenance organization (HMO) and 
point-of-service (POS) enrollee population. These plans require enrollees to designate a 
primary care physician (PCP), a feature also found in many patient-centered medical 
home models.
15-19
 Presently, the AQC does not extend to PPO enrollees, as they are not 
required to designate a PCP. Thus, when a provider organization enters the AQC, only its 
HMO/POS patients are encompassed by the contract.  
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The AQC contains 3 main features that distinguish it from traditional fee-for-
service contracts and from capitation contracts locally and nationally.
4
 First, physicians 
groups, in some cases together with a hospital, enter into 5-year global budget contracts 
(in contrast to 1-year contracts). Baseline budgets and future budget growth are based on 
negotiations with BCBS, but no group was given a 2009 budget below its 2008 spending. 
The budget covers the entire continuum of care, including inpatient, outpatient, 
rehabilitation, prescription drugs, and long-term care. The PCP’s organization is 
accountable for all enrollee services, regardless of whether the enrollee receives care 
from her PCP, the PCP’s organization, or any other provider. Since the model currently 
applies to only HMO/POS enrollees, enrollees must seek referrals for specialist care, 
consistent with those products’ benefit designs. During the year, BCBS pays claims on a 
FFS basis according to negotiated rates, with year-end budget reconciliation.  
Second, AQC groups are eligible for pay-for-performance bonuses up to 10 
percent of their budget, with ambulatory and hospital measures each comprising half of 
the bonus (Section 1.6.1). This potential bonus is substantially larger than typical pay-for-
performance programs in the US. BCBS sets a range of performance thresholds, or 
“gates,” for each measure at the beginning of the contract which remain fixed throughout 
the contract.
4
 Each measure receives an annual score based on performance. Scores are 
weighted and aggregated to calculate the bonus amount paid to the AQC group.  
Third, AQC groups receive technical support, including spending, utilization, and 
quality reports from BCBS to assist them in managing their budget and improving 
quality. In 2009, 7 physician organizations comprising 321 PCP practices and over 4000 
total physicians began assuming risk under the AQC for over 25 percent of BCBS 
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HMO/POS enrollees. Groups ranged from large physician-hospital organizations to small 
independent practices united by common leadership. Some AQC groups had prior risk 
contracts from BCBS, while others entered from FFS contracts without financial risk. By 
2011, the AQC has grown to 12 groups accounting for 44 percent of HMO/POS 
enrollees. I evaluate the impact of the AQC on health care spending and ambulatory 
quality measures in 2009. 
 
1.2. Methods 
 
1.2.1 Population 
The population included BCBS enrollees from January, 2006 through December, 
2009. From 2,335,593 total HMO and POS members, I excluded 701,079 who were not 
continuously enrolled for at least one calendar year. The remaining 1,634,514 members 
comprised the sample for the main analyses. All AQC and non-AQC providers with 
BCBS patients were included. 
 
1.2.2 Study Design 
I used a pre-post, intervention-control, difference-in-difference approach to isolate 
the AQC effect. For the spending analyses, the pre-intervention period was 2006 through 
2008 and post-intervention was 2009. The intervention group consisted of all enrollees 
who designated PCPs in practices that began assuming risk under the AQC in 2009. 
Within the intervention group, I also pre-specified 2 subgroups: one consisting of 
providers who had prior experience with risk-based contracts from BCBS (“prior-risk”), 
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and the other of providers who entered the AQC without BCBS risk experience (“no-
prior-risk”). I hypothesized that the AQC would have a bigger effect on spending in the 
no-prior-risk subgroup. 
I compared spending between all AQC groups and control, prior-risk groups and 
control, as well as no-prior-risk groups and control. For all 3 comparisons, I decomposed 
the AQC effect in 4 ways to understand the source of spending differences. First, I 
decomposed by clinical category using the Berenson-Eggers Type of Service (BETOS) 
classification version 2009 from CMS.
20
 Second, I decomposed the findings by site 
(inpatient versus outpatient) and type of care (professional versus facility). Third, I 
examined results by quartile of enrollee health risk.  
Lastly, I separated the AQC effect into price and utilization components by 
repricing claims for each service to its median price across all providers in the study 
period. Repriced spending differences reflect only utilization differences. Moreover, I 
examined measures of utilization such as admissions or procedures directly. I further 
decomposed the spending differences due to price (fees) into two potential explanations: 
differential fee changes (AQC groups may have received lower fee increases than non-
AQC) and referral pattern changes (AQC enrollees may have received more care from 
lower fee providers). This was done by repricing claims to the median 2009 price for 
each service within each practice.  
The quality analysis compared performance on ambulatory process measures 
between all AQC groups and control using 2007-2009 data. These measures are primary 
care-oriented and under direct control of the AQC groups. The measures follow 
Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set (HEDIS) specifications, which are 
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used by most health plans. I analyzed individual measures and aggregate measures for 
chronic care management, adult preventive care, and pediatric care.  
For the spending analysis, the dependent variable was aggregate medical spending 
per member per quarter (combining BCBS spending and enrollee cost sharing). I 
excluded prescription drugs from the primary analysis because not all enrollees had 
prescription drug coverage through BCBS. Spending was computed from claims-level 
FFS payments made within the global budget. This is an accurate measure of medical 
spending based on utilization and negotiated FFS prices, but it does not capture the 
quality bonuses or end-of-year budget reconciliation.  
For each ambulatory quality measure, the dependent variable was a dichotomous 
variable indicating whether the measure was met for an eligible member in a given year. 
Eligibility is defined by member characteristics and diagnosis; for example, diabetes 
measures are restricted to members with diabetes. 
I controlled for age categories, interactions between age and sex, risk score, and 
secular trends to correct for differences in individual traits across treatment and control 
groups. Risk scores were calculated by BCBS from current year diagnoses, claims, and 
demographic information using the diagnostic-cost-group (DxCG/Verisk Health) score 
system,
22
 similar to the method used by CMS for risk adjustment of payments to 
Medicare Advantage plans. Higher scores denote lower health status and higher expected 
spending. The DxCG score is calculated from statistical analyses using a national claims 
database to relate current year spending to current year diagnoses and demographic 
information. 
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1.2.3 Empirical Approach 
All analyses were conducted at the enrollee-quarter level. I used a one-part 
generalized linear model with propensity weights,
21
 which mitigated differences in 
individual traits across treatment and control groups. Propensity weights were calculated 
using age, sex, and risk scores. For the spending analysis, the dependent variable was 
spending in dollars per member per quarter. The baseline model was not logarithmic-
transformed because the risk score is designed to predict dollar spending. Moreover, 
evidence shows that linear models perform better than more complex functional forms in 
predicting health spending.
23-26
  
I estimated the reduced-form model below, where Xit represents the vector of 
individual characteristics (age categories, interactions between age categories and sex, 
and the risk score). Additional independent variables included an indicator for the 
intervention (aqc), indicators for each quarter (q), and quarter-intervention interactions 
(q*aqc). I also included an indicator for the post-intervention period (post) as well as its 
interaction with the intervention group (post*aqc), which produced the estimate of the 
policy effect. Huber-White corrections were used to adjust standard errors for clustering 
of multiple observations for each individual.
27-28
  
 
Spendingit = αit + Xitδ + β1postt + β2aqci + β3(post*aqc)it + qtγ1 + (qt*aqci)γ2 + εit 
 
To assess the AQC impact on quality, I estimated an analogous difference-in-
difference model. For aggregate quality analysis, I pooled measures and adjusted for 
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measure-level fixed effects. Independent variables were analogous to the spending model, 
with year indicators in place of quarter indicators. 
 
Qualityit = αit + Xitδ + β1postt + β2aqci + β3(post*aqc)it + yrtλ1 + (yrt*aqc)λ2 + µit 
 
I conducted a number of sensitivity analyses (Section 1.6.3), including alterations 
to the statistical model, repeating analysis on subjects who were continuously enrolled 
throughout the 4-year study period, coding the risk score in deciles, omitting the 
propensity score weights, and explicitly including enrollee cost sharing in spending. For 
the quality analysis, I tested robustness of the linear probability model using a logit 
model. I also tested for risk score changes that would be consistent with the possibility 
that under a global payment system, physicians may upcode to garner increased 
payments, which would make AQC patients seem sicker and thus spending adjusted for 
health status seem lower. This was an issue in the evaluation of Medicare’s Physician 
Group Practice Demonstration.
30
 All analyses used STATA software, version 11. Results 
are reported with 2-tailed P values. The Harvard Medical School Office for Research 
Subject Protection approved the study. 
 
1.3. Results 
 
1.3.1. Spending 
There were 380,142 subjects with at least one year of continuous enrollment from 
2006 through 2009 in the intervention group and 1,351,446 such subjects in the control 
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group. Average age, sex distribution, and health risk scores were similar between the 
groups (Table 1.1). 
Health care spending increased for both AQC and non-AQC enrollees in 2009, 
but the increase was smaller for AQC enrollees (Table 1.2). Statistical estimates indicated 
that relative to control, the AQC was associated with a $15.51 decrease in average 
quarterly spending per enrollee in 2009 (p=0.007, 95 percent confidence interval -$27.21 
to -$3.81), a 1.9 percent savings. In the models, the interaction of the secular trend with 
the AQC indicator demonstrated no significant spending trend differences between AQC 
and non-AQC groups prior to the intervention ($0.89, p=0.28). 
Procedures, imaging, and tests accounted for over 80 percent of the savings. 
Further decomposition showed that savings largely derived from spending on facility 
services in the outpatient setting. There were no significant changes in inpatient spending 
or spending on physician services. The decomposition by member health status showed 
that members in the highest risk quartile accounted for most (-$14.75, p=0.01) of the 
savings (Figure 1.1). 
Models with standardized prices revealed no AQC effect on utilization. This was 
supported by quantity analyses of procedures, imaging, tests, admissions, and office 
visits. Thus, the observed savings reflect differences in price (Section 1.6.4). 
 
 Table 1.1. Characteristics of the Study Population.* 
 
Variable All AQC Groups 
(N=380,142) 
Control Group 
(N=1,351,446) 
         
 Pre-AQC 
(2006-08) 
Post-AQC 
(2009) 
Pre-AQC 
(2006-08) 
Post-AQC 
(2009) 
Member characteristics         
         
Age — yr 34.4 ± 18.6 35.3 ± 18.5 35.3 ± 18.7 35.5 ± 18.8 
Female sex — % 52.6 51.2 51.8 51.0 
Health risk score
&
 1.08 (0.12—1.29) 1.16 (0.13—1.39) 1.11 (0.11—1.33) 1.16 (0.12—1.39) 
 
* Plus-minus values are mean ± SD. Values in parentheses are the 25th and 75th percentiles. The number of total enrollees by 
summing treatment and control exceeds 1,634,514 because of enrollees who had a PCP in the treatment group and another in 
the control group for at least one year in each case. 
 
&
 Health risk score denotes enrollee health status and expected spending. It is calculated using the DxCG/Verisk Health 
system, which uses statistical analyses based on a national claims database to relate current year spending to current year 
diagnoses and demographic information. The DxCG method is a commonly used, proprietary method similar to Medicare’s 
Hierarchical Condition Category (HCC) system used for risk adjustment of prospective payments to Medicare Advantage 
plans (and developed by the same organization). DxCGs are designed for the under-65 population and are more detailed than 
the HCC system. Among all subjects, it ranged from 0 to 66 (mean = 1.13, standard deviation = 1.86). 
 
1
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 Table 1.2. Change in average health care spending per member per quarter in AQC and non-AQC groups.* 
 
A. All AQC groups vs. control All AQC Groups 
(N=380,142) 
Control Group 
(N=1,351,446) 
Between-Group 
Difference (p-value) 
        
 Pre Post Change Pre Post Change   
         
Total quarterly spending ($) 756 808 53 785 854 69 -15.51 (0.009) 
         
Spending by BETOS category †         
1. Evaluation and management 180 206 25 181 208 27 -2.22 (0.002) 
2. Procedures 166 176 10 168 184 16 -5.96 (0.001) 
3. Imaging 94 102 8 100 112 11 -3.47 (<0.001) 
4. Test 67 75 7 74 85 11 -3.72 (<0.001) 
5. Durable medical equipment 10 12 2 11 13 2 -0.14 (0.68) 
6. Other 48 50 2 54 55 1 0.80 (0.72) 
7. Exceptions/Unclassified 190 189 -1 197 197 0 -0.80 (0.84) 
         
Spending by site and type of care        
Inpatient - professional 35 36 2 34 37 2 -0.72 (0.38) 
Inpatient - facility 152 154 3 156 158 3 0.23 (0.95) 
Outpatient - professional 316 350 34 300 334 34 -0.28 (0.80) 
Outpatient - facility 214 230 16 255 285 30 -14.50 (<0.001) 
Ancillary 39 39 -1 40 40 0 -0.24 (0.86) 
 
The intervention group comprised enrollees whose primary care physicians were in the Alternative Quality Contract (AQC) 
system of Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts, and the control group comprised enrollees whose primary care physicians 
were not part of the AQC system. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts implemented the AQC system in 2009. All 
spending figures are in 2009 U.S. dollars. 
 
† The clinical categories were designated according to the Berenson–Eggers Type of Service (BETOS) classification, version 
2009. 
1
1
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Figure 1.1. Difference-in-difference estimates of the AQC effect on average health care 
spending per member per quarter, by risk quartile (all AQC groups versus control).* 
 
 
* Point estimates with 95 percent confidence intervals from the baseline model. 
 
This price effect could arise either because AQC groups received lower fee 
increases or because AQC enrollees were shifted to lower-fee providers. I found no 
differences in price trends (including hospital, non-hospital facility, and physician fees) 
for AQC and non-AQC providers. The model with prices standardized by physician 
practice revealed that the price effect was due to referral pattern changes whereby AQC 
patients were referred to lower-fee providers. Those providers could be in non-hospital 
settings (such as ambulatory surgery centers) or simply be hospitals that had lower 
13 
 
negotiated fees for outpatient care than other hospitals. This model demonstrated that 
referral shifts accounted for over 90 percent of the AQC-associated relative decrease in 
quarterly spending (-$14.21, p<0.001) in 2009 (Section 1.6.4).  
The prior-risk subgroup compared to control incurred statistically insignificant 
total savings of $9.29 (p=0.13, -$21.45 to $2.86), or 1.1 percent, per member per quarter. 
In contrast, the no-prior-risk subgroup experienced larger and statistically significant 
savings of $45.52 (p=0.006, -$78.13 to -$12.90) or 6.3 percent, suggesting that it drove 
the main findings. Subgroup decompositions mirrored decompositions of main findings 
(Section 1.6.2). An interaction test of the differential AQC effect between the two 
subgroups yielded -$32.94 (p=0.06, -$66.72 to $0.83). Sensitivity analyses supported 
these results (Section 1.6.3). 
 
1.3.2. Quality 
The AQC was associated with a 2.6 percentage-point increase in eligible members 
meeting quality thresholds for chronic care management (p<0.001) and a 0.7 percentage-
point increase in eligible members meeting pediatric care thresholds (p=0.001) (Table 
1.3). The AQC was not associated with significant improvement in adult preventive care. 
Comparisons between prior-risk and control as well as no-prior-risk and control yielded 
similar results (not shown). 
 Table 1.3. Change in ambulatory quality performance in AQC and non-AQC groups.* 
 
Quality metric (% of eligible enrollees who 
met the performance threshold) 
All AQC groups Control groups Difference 
(percentage points) 
 Pre Post Change Pre Post Change Unadj. Adjusted (P value) 
          
Chronic Care Management (aggregate) 79.1 82.4 3.3 79.6 80.1 0.5 2.8 2.6 (<0.001) 
Cardiovascular LDL screening 88.6 90.4 1.8 90.2 90.3 0.1 1.7 1.8 (0.04) 
Diabetes: HbA1c testing 89.3 92.0 2.7 89.3 90.2 0.9 1.8 1.7 (<0.001) 
Diabetes: eye exam 58.5 63.6 5.1 61.3 60.8 -0.5 5.6 5.5 (<0.001) 
Diabetes: LDL screening 86.6 90.5 3.9 86.3 87.3 1.0 2.9 2.8 (<0.001) 
Diabetes: Nephrology screening 85.1 87.4 2.3 83.5 84.2 0.7 1.6 1.6 (0.001) 
Depression: acute Rx 67.2 66.4 -0.8 66.9 66.9 0.0 -0.8 -1.1 (0.59) 
Depression: continuation Rx 51.2 52.0 0.8 50.9 50.2 -0.7 1.5 1.1 (0.59) 
          
Adult Preventive Care (aggregate) 75.7 79.3 3.6 72.8 76.2 3.4 0.2 0.1 (0.67) 
Breast cancer screening 80.2 83.2 3.0 79.5 81.9 2.4 0.6 0.6 (0.006) 
Cervical cancer screening 87.3 87.6 0.3 84.4 85.2 0.8 -0.5 -0.5 (0.002) 
Colorectal cancer screening 64.2 70.7 6.5 60.0 66.5 6.5 0.0 0.0 (0.97) 
Chlamydia screening (ages 21-24) 58.6 64.5 5.9 53.4 60.1 6.7 -0.8 -0.8 (0.41) 
No antibiotic: acute bronchitis
&
 18.7 25.9 7.2 19.5 21.1 1.6 5.6 5.5 (<0.001) 
          
Pediatric Care (aggregate) 79.5 81.8 2.3 74.6 76.6 2.0 0.3 0.7 (0.001) 
Appropriate testing for pharyngitis 93.9 96.0 2.1 82.1 88.4 6.3 -4.2 -3.9 (<0.001) 
Chlamydia screening (ages 16-20) 54.8 63.7 8.9 51.1 54.7 3.6 5.3 5.4 (<0.001) 
No antibiotic: upper respiratory infection 94.9 95.8 0.9 91.6 92.8 1.2 -0.3 -0.4 (0.52) 
Well care: baby (ages <15 mo.) 93.0 93.1 0.1 92.7 92.9 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 (0.91) 
Well care: child (ages 3-6) 92.3 94.1 1.8 90.0 91.2 1.2 0.6 0.6 (0.09) 
Well care: adolescent 73.8 76.8 3.0 69.1 71.4 2.3 0.7 0.9 (<0.001) 
 
* Adjusted results are from a propensity-weighted difference-in-difference model controlling for all covariates and secular 
trends. The three aggregate analyses used pooled observations and are further adjusted for measure fixed effects.
1
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1.3.3. BCBS Payments 
The AQC-associated savings do not imply that total payments made by BCBS 
declined. Total BCBS payments must take into account quality bonuses and end-of-year 
budget surpluses paid to the AQC groups. In 2009, quality bonuses were generally 
between 3-6 percent of budgets. Additional BCBS support for information technology, 
staffing, and other needs were between 0-2 percent of budgets. Moreover, all AQC 
groups spent under their 2009 budget targets, earning on average 3 percent in budget 
surpluses (consistent with the findings). Taken together, these first year investments and 
payouts exceeded the average estimated savings of 1.9 percent, suggesting BCBS total 
payments rose for AQC groups in the first year. 
 
1.4. Discussion 
 
The AQC was associated with modestly lower medical spending and improved 
quality in the first year after implementation. The savings largely derived from shifting 
outpatient care to lower-fee providers, and mostly from high risk enrollees. Savings were 
larger among providers previously paid FFS by BCBS. These results were robust to a 
series of sensitivity analyses and do not appear to be attributable to upcoding. In addition, 
spending trends prior to the intervention were not statistically different between the AQC 
and non-AQC groups.  
Quality improvements are likely due to a combination of substantial financial 
incentives and BCBS data support. AQC quality bonuses are much higher than most pay-
16 
 
for-performance programs in the US, as it applies to the entire global budget rather than 
to only physician or PCP services.
31
  
This study is subject to several limitations. The study population was young and 
included only POS and HMO members. Thus, results may not generalize to the Medicare 
population, PPO or indemnity plan enrollees, or other states. However, effects were 
greater for enrollees who had higher expected spending, so programs serving older 
populations may experience even larger savings. Furthermore, I do not observe details of 
each AQC contract, which varied to some degree, or details of provider risk contracting 
with other payers. While the results suggest quality improved, process measures do not 
completely capture quality. Formal evaluation of outcome measures could not be 
conducted due to the lack of pre-AQC enrollee-level outcomes data. However, a 
weighted average of 5 outcomes metrics at the provider organization level suggests that 
AQC groups achieved better or comparable outcomes in 2009 compared to recent BCBS 
network averages (Section 1.6.5). 
The findings do not imply that overall spending fell for BCBS in the first year. 
This reflects the design of the AQC, which focuses on slowing the growth of spending 
and improving quality initially rather than saving money in the first year. The AQC 
targets were set based on actuarial projections to save money over the 5-year contract, 
even after anticipated quality bonuses. Initial investments help to motivate participation 
and support the delivery system changes required for providers to succeed in managing 
spending and improving quality. Because provider groups mostly bear the risk, fiscal 
success from the insurer perspective depends on how well budgets and bonuses are set. 
17 
 
In total, the magnitude of savings was modest. Sustainability of the AQC and the 
financial viability of the model for providers will ultimately depend on identifying and 
addressing clinically inefficient care and changing utilization patterns. Nevertheless, the 
findings on referral pattern changes and quality improvements suggest that provider 
groups changed behavior in 2009. Importantly, referral pattern changes can subsequently 
affect pricing in the health care market, as high-price facilities feel pressure from 
decreased volume. Future studies will need to assess whether changes in utilization and 
the broader market lead to larger savings. 
This initial evaluation offers several lessons for payment reform.
32-34
 First, quality 
need not be threatened by global payment, and process measures can improve given 
clinically-aligned incentives. Other aspects of quality remain to be evaluated. Second, 
global payment can introduce greater price competition into the market as referrals move 
from high-price to low-price facilities. This is a bigger issue for private purchasers since 
Medicare regulates prices. Finally, even under strong financial incentives, utilization will 
not change rapidly. Slowing the growth rate of health care spending will ultimately 
depend on budget updates and the ability of providers to practice in this new 
environment. 
18 
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 Section 1.6.1. 
 
Table 1.4. Performance measurements in the Alternative Quality Contract
 
 
* Each quality measure has designated performance thresholds ranging from Gate 1 (low) to Gate 
5 (high), which denote absolute performance based on the percent of eligible members who 
achieved the measure. Scores for all measures are weighted and summed to a total score. Bonus 
payment (up to 10% of the global budget) is calculated using a non-linear function of the total 
score. 
 
Ambulatory Measures  Hospital Measures 
Measure Gate 1 Gate 5 Weight Measure Gate 1 Gate 5 Weight 
Depression    AMI    
1 Acute Phase Prescription 65.3 80.0 1.0 1ACE/ARB for LVSD 89.1 98.9 1.0 
2 Continuation Phase Prescription 49.6 70.0 1.0 2Aspirin at arrival 98.3  1.0 
Diabetes    3Aspirin at discharge 98.2  1.0 
3 HbA1c Testing (2X) 69.9 83.2 1.0 4Beta Blocker at arrival * 96.9  1.0 
4 Eye Exams 58.0 72.1 1.0 5Beta Blocker at discharge 98.5  1.0 
5 Nephropathy Screening 79.7 91.4 1.0 6Smoking Cessation 93.1 99.9 1.0 
Cholesterol Management    Heart Failure    
6 Diabetes LDL-C Screening 85.3 93.8 1.0 7 ACE LVSD 87.3 98.9 1.0 
7 Cardiovascular LDL-C Screening 85.3 93.8 1.0 8 LVS function Evaluation 95.1 100.0 1.0 
Preventive Screening/Treatment    9 Discharge instructions 71.4 98.5 1.0 
8 Breast Cancer Screening 77.1 90.0 1.0 10 Smoking Cessation 88.3 99.6 1.0 
9 Cervical Cancer Screening 83.5 92.4 1.0 Pneumonia    
10 Colorectal Cancer Screening 65.2 83.3 1.0 11 Flu Vaccine 77.8 98.6 1.0 
Chlamydia 
Screening 
   13 Antibiotics w/in 6 hrs 95.6 99.8 1.0 
11 Ages 16-20 45.9 63.7 0.5 14 Oxygen assessment 100.0  1.0 
12 Ages 21-24 50.1 67.3 0.5 15 Smoking Cessation 86.7 99.8 1.0 
Adult Respiratory Testing/Treatment    16 Antibiotic selection 87.4 95.4 1.0 
13 Acute Bronchitis Reporting Only 2009, 2010 1.0 17 Blood culture 91.0 98.0 1.0 
Medication Management    Surgical Infection    
14 Digoxin Monitoring 83.9 91.6 1.0 18 Antibiotic received 86.5 98.9 1.0 
Pedi: Testing/Treatment    19 Received Appropriate Preventive 
Antibiotic(s) 
94.1 99.4 1.0 
15 Upper Respiratory Infection (URI) 90.6 97.7 1.0 20 Antibiotic discontinued 77.9 96.2 1.0 
16 Pharyngitis 83.1 99.6 1.0     
Pedi: Well-visits        
17 < 15 months 91.8 99.3 1.0     
18 3-6 Years 85.5 99.2 1.0     
19 Adolescent Well Care Visits 60.0 87.7 1.0     
Diabetes    21 In-Hospital Mortality - Overall 2.15 0.88 1.0 
20HbA1c in Poor Control 45.0 4.7 3.0 22 Wound Infection 0.30 0.09 1.0 
21LDL-C Control (<100mg) 33.4 75.6 3.0 23 Select Infections due to Medical Care 0.18 0.02 1.0 
22Blood Pressure Control (130/80) 30.9 47.3 3.0 24 AMI after Major Surgery 0.55 0.10 1.0 
Hypertension    25 Pneumonia after Major Surgery 1.57 0.60 1.0 
23Controlling High Blood Pressure 71.6 82.5 3.0 26 Post-Operative PE/DVT 0.93 0.22 1.0 
Cardiovascular Disease    27 Birth Trauma - injury to neonate 0.20 0.01 1.0 
24LDL-C Control (<100mg) 33.4 75.6 3.0 28 Obstetrics Trauma-vaginal w/o 
instrument 
3.54 1.54 1.0 
Patient Experiences (C/G CAH PS/ACES) 
Adult 
   
Hospital Patient Experience (H-CAHPS) 
Measures 
   
25 Communication Quality 91.0 98.0 1.0 29 Communication with Nurses 72.6 81.2 1.0 
26 Knowledge of Patients 80.0 95.0 1.0 30 Communication with Doctors 78.1 85.5 1.0 
27 Integration of Care 80.0 96.0 1.0 31 Responsiveness of staff 58.4 76.4 1.0 
28 Access to Care 79.0 96.0 1.0 32 Discharge Information 77.7 90.4 1.0 
Patient Experiences (C/G CAH PS/ACES) 
Pediatric 
       
29 Communication Quality 95.0 97.0 1.0     
30 Knowledge of Patients 89.0 93.0 1.0     
31 Integration of Care 85.0 91.0 1.0     
32 Access to Care 70.0 90.0 1.0     
 
  
Section 1.6.2. Sensitivity analyses methods and results 
 
I conducted several sensitivity analyses. First, I restricted analysis to 548,677 
individuals with 48-month continuous enrollment. Second, I redefined the linear risk 
score into categories bounded by its 10
th
, 25
th
, 50
th
, 75
th
, 90
th
, and 95
th
 percentiles and 
reran the models. Third, I controlled for secular trends using a linear time variable rather 
than quarterly dummies. Fourth, I repeated all models without propensity score 
weighting. Fifth, I aggregated spending at the annual to test whether results were 
sensitive to sample size. Sixth, I repeated analyses on the subpopulation of members with 
pharmacy benefits and included drug spending within the total. Seventh, I removed 
enrollee cost-sharing from spending and repeated the models. Linear models perform 
better than more complex functional forms in predicting health spending while avoiding 
assumptions concerning heteroskedasticity and distribution of spending required in a non-
linear context.
23-25
 Linear models also avoid complications in interpreting interaction 
effects.
26
 Lastly, I verified the results using a 2-part model, which consisted of logistic 
regression of the probability of having any spending followed by linear regression of 
spending conditional on any spending. Estimated coefficients with smearing adjustments 
are used to calculate expected spending and the delta method was used to estimate 
standard errors.
29
 For the quality analyses, I tested the robustness of findings to the use of 
a logit model instead of a linear probability model.  
Results of sensitivity analyses support the main findings (Table 1.5). Estimates of 
the AQC effect on spending remain similar to the baseline case and effect sizes for the 
no-prior-risk subgroup remain larger than for the prior-risk subgroup. Sensitivity analyses 
  
results support the main findings in several ways. Restricting analyses to 48-month 
continuously enrolled members did not alter the estimates, ameliorating adverse selection 
concerns. Relative savings by risk category were also unchanged after using quintiles or 
tertiles. Alternate controls for secular trends did not change the findings. Propensity score 
weights were used to balance traits between intervention and control groups, and their 
omission did not impact the results. Different levels of spending aggregation also 
produced similar results. Omitting cost-sharing from all claims did not change the 
estimates, suggesting that benefit design was not differentially heterogeneous among 
treatment and control enrollees. Finally, restricting analyses to members with pharmacy 
benefits with drug spending included did not change the findings. The descriptive 
analyses showed that enrollees were similar in age, sex, and risk score across intervention 
and control groups. I also demonstrated that trends in spending prior to the intervention 
were not statistically different. Finally, the use of a 2-part model with logarithmic 
transformation and logistic models to analyze spending and quality did not change the 
results (not shown). 
The analyses of risk trends indicate an increase in risk in the AQC group relative 
to the controls. This might reflect a true increase in risk, which is important to control for, 
or upcoding. The finding was much smaller and not statistically significant in the no-
prior-risk group, which accounts for the largest savings. Nevertheless, if one assumed all 
of the increase in risk was due to upcoding, the AQC effect would be attenuated by 
between 18 to 38 percent.  
Although there was an increase in risk among the AQC group, the results are 
likely not driven by upcoding for several reasons. First, the results are robust to 
  
measuring risk in deciles, which would be less sensitive to upcoding. Second, the 
increased risk was not apparent in the no-prior-risk group, where savings is largest.  
Third, upcoding would presumably affect the analyses of utilization, and lead me to 
erroneously conclude that volumes decreased after the intervention. However, I found no 
AQC effect on utilization. Fourth, upcoding would likely affect both professional and 
facility spending and fees, but I found effects only on facility spending and fees.  
  
Table 1.5. Sensitivity analyses of difference-in-difference estimates of the association 
between the AQC and health care spending.* 
 
All AQC vs. 
Non-AQC 
P 
value 
Prior-risk 
vs. Non-AQC 
P 
value 
No-prior-risk 
vs. Non-AQC 
P value 
 
Association between the AQC and average quarterly spending per enrollee ($) 
 
Main estimates 
-15.51 0.009 -9.29 0.13 -45.52 0.006 
 
Sensitivity analyses 
 
(1) Restricting analyses to the subset of 48-month continuous enrolled members 
-18.79 0.01 -12.64 0.11 -42.21 0.050 
 
(2) Controlling for health risk score as categorical rather than continuous variable 
-16.08 0.01 -10.30 0.11 -46.31 0.008 
 
(3) Controlling for secular time trend as continuous rather than categorical variable  
-24.21 0.050 -19.21 0.13 -34.35 0.30 
 
(4) Omitting propensity score weights 
-15.85 0.008 -9.54 0.13 -45.82 0.006 
 
(5) Annual rather than quarterly spending as the dependent variable 
-63.90 0.006 -42.47 0.08 -162.73 0.01 
 
(6) Omitting cost-sharing from claims 
-16.17 0.007 -9.80 0.12 -46.92 0.004 
 
(7) Restricting analyses to members with pharmacy benefits and including drug spending 
-19.18 0.005 -13.14 0.07 -48.02 0.009 
 
* Main estimates are from the baseline difference-in-difference model using quarterly spending as 
the dependent variable, age categories, age-sex interactions, continuous risk, indicators for each 
quarter, and quarter*AQC interactions. The baseline model uses the sample of members 
continuously enrolled for at least 12 months over the 4-year study period and uses propensity 
weights. Rows (1) through (7) show analogous results from sensitivity analyses. Results of the 
annual spending model (5) should be divided by 4 to be comparable to the quarterly estimates. 
All analyses use Huber-White robust standard errors. 
 
  
Section 1.6.3. Decomposition of spending results into price and utilization effects.  
 
This section details the decomposition of the difference-in-difference estimate of 
the association between the AQC and health care spending into its price and utilization 
(quantity) components. To better understand how the AQC groups achieved lower 
spending relative to non-AQC groups in 2009, I first repriced outpatient facility claims 
for each service to its median price across all providers in all 4 years of the study period. 
I performed repriced analysis on only outpatient facility claims because outpatient facility 
spending accounted for the bulk of the association between AQC and spending (see Table 
1.2 and Table 1.6). Moreover, inpatient services are priced differently (diagnostic related 
groups or DRGs, rather than fees).  
Repeating the difference-in-difference regression analyses using the repriced 
claims allowed me to isolate the share of spending differences due to utilization 
(quantity), rather than price. I found that, relative to control, the AQC was associated 
with a $2.62 (p=0.25) decrease in average quarterly spending per enrollee in 2009. 
Compared to the main estimate of a $15.51 savings associated with the AQC (decrease in 
spending relative to control), this repriced estimate is small and insignificant, suggesting 
that the main result is driven by price differences, not by utilization. Sensitivity analyses 
using direct measures of utilization (quantity) as the dependent variable in the model, 
such as the number of procedures, images, tests, admissions, or office visits, yielded no 
negative and significant association between the AQC and utilization. This result, 
however, still left two potential explanations for the price effect on spending. 
  
Thus, I further decomposed the spending differences into two potential price-
driven explanations: differential fee changes (AQC groups may have received lower fee 
increases than non-AQC) and referral pattern changes (AQC enrollees may have received 
care from lower fee providers). This was done by repricing claims to median 2009 prices 
for each service within each practice. This differs from the first repricing method above 
because it retains the variation in prices between practices, while standardizing prices 
within each practice (the Massachusetts Office of the Attorney General has documented 
the variation in prices between practices
*
). The resulting association between AQC and 
spending reflects changes in the share of spending across practices, which I denoted the 
referral effect. This difference-in-difference model produced an AQC-associated relative 
spending decrease of $14.21 (p<0.001), which is approximately 90 percent of the main 
AQC-associated savings in year 1. This finding was supported by further sensitivity 
analyses. For example, I found no consistent differences in price trends (including 
hospital, non-hospital facility, and physician fees) for AQC and non-AQC providers. 
 
 
 
* See “Examination of Health Care Cost Trends and Cost Drivers: Report for Annual 
Public Hearing, March 16, 2010” released by the Office of the Attorney General Martha 
Coakley. 
 
 
  
Section 1.6.4.  
 
Table 1.6. Change in average health care spending per member per quarter in AQC and non-AQC groups, prior-risk subgroup 
vs. control and no-prior-risk subgroup vs. control.* 
 
 
Prior-risk subgroup vs. control Prior Risk AQC groups 
(N=341,615) 
Control Group 
(N=1,351,446) 
Between-Group 
Difference (p-value) 
        
 Pre Post Change Pre Post Change   
         
Total quarterly spending ($) 757 816 58 781 850 69 -9.29 (0.13) 
         
Spending by BETOS category         
1. Evaluation and management 182 209 27 180 208 27 -0.25 (0.74) 
2. Procedures 166 178 12 167 183 16 -4.46 (0.01) 
3. Imaging 94 103 8 100 111 11 -2.80 (<0.001) 
4. Test 67 75 8 74 85 11 -3.01 (<0.001) 
5. Durable medical equipment 10 11 2 11 13 2 -0.16 (0.65) 
6. Other 48 50 2 53 54 1 1.03 (0.66) 
7. Exceptions/Unclassified 190 190 0 196 196 0 0.36 (0.93) 
         
Spending by site and type of care        
Inpatient - professional 35 37 2 34 36 2 -0.37 (0.66) 
Inpatient - facility 152 155 3 154 157 3 0.85 (0.83) 
Outpatient - professional 319 355 37 299 333 34 2.85 (0.02) 
Outpatient - facility 212 230 18 254 284 30 -12.16 (<0.001) 
Ancillary 40 39 -1 40 40 0 -0.46 (0.74) 
 
3
0
 
  
Table 1.7. 
 
No-prior-risk subgroup vs. control No Prior Risk AQC groups 
(N=40,468) 
Control Group 
(N=1,351,446) 
Between-Group 
Difference (p-value) 
        
 Pre Post Change Pre Post Change   
         
Total quarterly spending ($) 698 725 27 791 859 68 -45.52 (0.006) 
         
Spending by BETOS category         
1. Evaluation and management 164 180 16 181 208 27 -12.38 (<0.001) 
2. Procedures 154 158 4 169 185 16 -13.46 (0.003) 
3. Imaging 86 92 6 101 112 11 -6.13 (0.001) 
4. Test 68 70 2 75 86 11 -9.34 (<0.001) 
5. Durable medical equipment 10 12 2 11 13 2 -0.17 (0.86) 
6. Other 45 46 1 54 56 1 -0.09 (0.99) 
7. Exceptions/Unclassified 171 168 -3 200 199 -1 -3.96 (0.72) 
         
Spending by site and type of care        
Inpatient - professional 30 30 1 34 37 2 -1.81 (0.32) 
Inpatient - facility 133 138 5 158 160 2 1.15 (0.91) 
Outpatient - professional 275 299 24 301 335 34 -11.27 (<0.001) 
Outpatient - facility 227 222 -5 258 287 30 -36.80 (<0.001) 
Ancillary 34 37 3 41 40 0 3.21 (0.39) 
 
* Total enrollees in prior-risk and no-prior-risk subgroups exceeds 380,142 because of enrollees who had a PCP in prior-risk and a PCP in 
no-prior-risk for at least one year in each case. Average spending in the non-AQC group differs slightly across Table 2 and this Section 
due to adjustments for age, sex, and health risk score across different sample sizes of the treatment group.
3
1
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Section 1.6.5.  
 
Table 1.8. Unadjusted outcome quality for BCBS and 2009 AQC Groups* 
 
 
BCBS Network Average  
AQC Weighted 
Average 
     
2007 2008 2009  2009 
      
Diabetes      
   HbA1c Control (<9 percent) 83.7 79.8 82.0  80.7 
   LDL-C Control (<100 mg/dL) 45.7 51.3 51.3  57.7 
   Blood Pressure Control (130/80) 30.9 36.7 38.0  44.3 
      
Hypertension      
   Controlling High Blood Pressure (140/90) 68.4 70.3 69.5  68.4 
      
Cardiovascular Disease      
   LDL-C Control (<100 mg/dL) 64.2 69.5 69.5  69.9 
 
* Outcome quality scores denote the percent of eligible enrollees for whom the quality 
performance threshold was met. Scores are weighted by eligible members for each measure. 
These scores are unadjusted averages.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Unintended consequences of redistributing Medicare payments from 
specialists to primary care physicians* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* A version of this chapter has been submitted for publication. Please do not circulate. 
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2.1. Introduction 
 
Facing an imperative to control the growth of health care spending, policymakers 
are looking to the physician payment system for savings.
1-4
 The Medicare Physician Fee 
Schedule, which lists the prices that Medicare pays for each physician service under Part 
B of Medicare, faces multiple impending cuts. The recent failure of the bipartisan “super 
committee” to agree on a debt reduction plan triggers automatic cuts of 2 percent per year 
to the fee schedule beginning in 2013. Meanwhile, the sustainable growth rate formula is 
due to slash Medicare fees by close to 30 percent in 2013.
5
 Such across-the-board fee cuts 
are highly controversial. 
As an alternative, some proposals call for lowering specialist fees while 
preserving or raising primary care physician (PCP) fees. The physician fee schedule 
contains large payment differences between primary care and specialty services, deriving 
from the resource-based relative value system.
6,7
 These fee differences have been linked 
to a substantial income gap between PCPs and specialists and the shortage of students 
entering primary care.
8-11
 In 2011, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission voted to 
replace the sustainable growth rate system with a 10-year plan that would cut specialist 
payments in the Medicare fee schedule by 5.9 percent in each of the first 3 years before 
freezing them for the next 7, while freezing PCP fees for all 10 years.
12
 To date, there is 
little research on the effect of such asymmetric fee cuts. 
On January 1, 2010, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) 
undertook a targeted policy to redistribute Medicare payments from specialists to PCPs 
by cutting specialists fees and raising PCP fees for typical physician visits. Specifically, 
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CMS eliminated payments for consultations from the fee schedule, billed more frequently 
by specialists, while raising fees for office visits, more frequently used by PCPs.
13
 
Similar to consultations, physicians bill for office visits (also known as 
“evaluation and management”) using a set of codes that contains 5 levels of clinical 
complexity for both “new” patient visits (Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System 
(HCPCS) codes 99201-99205) and “established” patient visits (99211-99215). 
Consultations had previously commanded higher payments than office visits at each level 
of clinical complexity. In 2009 for example, Medicare paid $124.79 on average for a 
consultation of medium complexity, compared to $91.97 for a new patient office visit and 
$61.31 for an established patient office visit of medium complexity. In place of 
consultations, the 2010 policy instructed all physicians to bill for office visits. Despite the 
simultaneous fee increase for office visits, they remained well below prior consultation 
fees, with new office visits 16-26 percent lower and established office visits 42-61 
percent lower than their consultation counterparts from 2009 (Section 2.6.1). The 
compensatory increase in office visit fees averaged about 5 percent (Section 2.6.2).  
CMS designed the policy to be budget neutral—amounting to a transfer of dollars 
from specialists to PCPs.
13
 Budget neutrality was based on a CMS assumption of no 
“upcoding.”14 In other words, physicians were assumed to bill for office visits of the 
same level of complexity as they had done for prior consultation codes. I evaluated the 
effects of this policy on spending, volume, and intensity of coding for office encounters 
in the first year of implementation.  
 
2.2. Methods 
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2.2.1. Study Population 
The population consisted of Medicare beneficiaries drawn from the 2007-2010 
Thomson Reuters MarketScan Medicare Supplemental claims database. This database 
consists of a large convenience sample of U.S. Medicare beneficiaries with Medicare 
Supplemental (Medigap) coverage through large employers. For all of these beneficiaries, 
Medicare is the primary payer and all Medicare claims are reported in the data.
15
 
From a total of 2.9 million beneficiaries, I excluded 326,491 beneficiaries who 
were not enrolled for at least 1 calendar year. In addition, I excluded 311,271 subjects 
who were enrolled in health maintenance organization or other plans paid through 
capitation. Physicians for beneficiaries in capitated plans may not be directly affected by 
the fee schedule changes. The final analytic sample comprised 2.2 million beneficiaries 
who were enrolled for at least 1 year. In one of the sensitivity analyses, I further restricted 
the sample to 798,262 beneficiaries who were continuously enrolled for all 4 years in the 
data. I compared baseline characteristics of the population before and after the 
intervention using t-tests for continuous variables and the Pearson Chi-squared test for 
categorical variables.  
 
2.2.2. Study Design 
I used an interrupted time series (segmented regression) design to estimate the 
effect of the Medicare policy on spending, volume, and intensity of coding for all 3 types 
of outpatient encounters (consultations, new patient office visits, and established patient 
office visits). The pre-intervention period was 2007-2009, and the post-intervention 
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period was 2010. I analyzed the policy’s effects on all encounters, as well as on each type 
of encounter.  
In the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule, determination of the clinical complexity 
of a patient-physician encounter is somewhat subjective. For example, a level 1 new 
patient office visit is characterized by a “problem-focused” history and physical 
examination involving “straightforward” medical decision-making, typically requiring 10 
minutes. In contrast, a level 5 new patient office visit entails a “comprehensive” history 
and examination involving decision making of “high complexity,” typically requiring 60 
minutes (Section 2.6.3). I examined changes in the coding of complexity associated with 
the policy, adjusting for actual health status, baseline trends, and other covariates.  
I also decomposed the policy’s effect by provider specialty. Specifically, I 
assigned claims to the PCP category if provider specialty was internal medicine, family 
medicine, geriatric medicine, pediatrics, or preventive medicine. These providers 
accounted for about half of the claims. The remaining half was assigned to the specialist 
category, with a small fraction of non-physicians and facility providers excluded. I used 
only outpatient claims and included both professional and facility fees for all encounters. 
 
2.2.3. Empirical Approach 
For the spending analysis, the dependent variable was spending (in 2010 U.S. 
dollars). Spending was computed from claims-level total payments, including employer 
and beneficiary cost sharing. For analyses of volume, the dependent variable was the 
number encounters. Each encounter was a unique instance of a consultation or office 
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code for a unique beneficiary on a unique day. For the complexity analysis, the dependent 
variable was the encounter’s level of complexity.  
Independent variables included age, sex, health risk score, secular trends, 
indicators for quarter of the year, and indicators for the beneficiary’s hospital referral 
region (HRR). Taking beneficiary demographic information and ICD-9 diagnoses in the 
claims, I calculated health risk scores using the CMS hierarchical condition categories 
(CMS-HCC) model, which is used for formal risk adjustment of payments to Medicare 
Advantage plans.
16
 This model generates a risk score based on age, sex, and diagnoses. 
HRRs are hospital markets constructed based on where patients receive care and are 
commonly used in the study of geographic variations in spending and utilization.
17,18
 
Over 90 percent of beneficiaries in Medicare live in one of the 306 HHRs where over 80 
percent of residents’ care is delivered by providers in that HRR.19  
Since cost sharing also affects utilization of services, I included each beneficiary’s 
cost sharing as a percentage of total encounter spending in the model as a sensitivity 
analysis. This is a unique variable in the Marketscan Medicare claims data which is not 
available in traditional Medicare Part B claims.  
All statistical analyses were conducted at the beneficiary-quarter level. I used a 
multivariate interrupted time series (segmented regression) model of the following form. 
 
yit = αit + XitП + β1trendt + β2pre2009t + β3post2010t + τt + δi + εit 
 
The vector of individual characteristics, Xit, comprises age categories, interactions 
between age categories and sex, and the CMS-HCC risk score. I include an underlying 
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linear trend over the 4 year period, a dummy variable for pre-2009 to account for an 
unrelated policy that increased payments in the 2009 fee schedule, and a dummy variable 
for post-2010 which identifies the discontinuity in the outcome variable after 2010. The 
coefficient β3 reflects the change in average quarterly levels of the outcome after the 
policy took effect, controlling for pre-intervention trends. In other words, the model 
captures a discontinuity in “cell” averages in 2010 compared to before, rather than a 
discrete change at quarter 1 of 2010 from annual trends. The cell average model with an 
underlying trend is preferred over the year-to-year trend break model for two reasons. 
First, any volatility in annual trends can dramatically affect the treatment effect given 
only 4 data points for each year. Second, and more importantly, given only 1 year of 
post-intervention data, it is likely premature to interpret any significant coefficient on the 
2010 trend as a true policy effect. Thus, the model identifies an average level change. 
Standard errors were clustered at the hospital referral region level, which produces even 
more conservative standard errors than alternative methods of individual-level 
generalized estimation equation models.
20,21
  
I conducted a number of sensitivity analyses from the baseline model, including 
omitting quarter fixed effects for seasonality, HRR fixed effects, secular trend, and 
individual beneficiary characteristics (Section 2.6.4). I also repeated analysis on the 
continuous 4-year enrollees, as well as repeating analysis after including of cost sharing 
in the model. All analyses were conducted using STATA software, version 11 (Statacorp; 
College Station, TX). Results are reported with two-tailed P values. The Harvard Medical 
School Office for Research Subject Protection approved the study protocol. 
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2.3. Results 
There were 2,247,810 unique Medicare beneficiaries who were continuously 
enrolled for at least one year during the study period. Table 2.1 describes the age 
distribution, gender, CMS-HCC risk scores, and region of residence for the population 
before and after the 2010 policy. 
 
Table 2.1. Characteristics of the Study Population.* 
 
Characteristics Medicare Beneficiaries  
 (N=2,247,810)  
   
 
 
Before elimination of 
consultations (2007-09) 
After elimination of 
consultations (2010) 
 
P value 
    
Member characteristics    
Mean age (yrs) 75.0 ± 7.4 75.5 ± 7.4 <0.001 
Age distribution (%)   <0.001 
65-69 yrs 29.9 26.8  
70-74 yrs  22.2 22.8  
75-79 yrs  20.4 20.4  
80-84 yrs  15.7 16.5  
≥85 yrs  11.7 13.4  
    
Male sex (%) 45.1 45.5 <0.001 
CMS-HCC risk score † 0.56 ± 0.20 0.52 ± 0.21 <0.001 
    
Region of residence (%)   <0.001 
Northeast 14.6 14.5  
North central 38.9 44.2  
South 34.3 32.3  
West 12.1 8.9  
 
* Plus-minus values are mean ± SD. Variables before and after the intervention were compared 
using t-tests for continuous variables and the Pearson Chi-squared test for categorical variables.  
 
† The CMS-HCC risk score is the concurrent risk score calculated from age, sex, and diagnoses 
information using the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Hierarchical Condition 
Category (HCC) system.  
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2.3.1. Spending 
In the first year, the policy eliminated an average of $18.52 per beneficiary per 
quarter (95% confidence interval [CI], -$19.48 to -$17.55; p<0.001) in consultation 
spending. At the same time, spending increased by $13.64 (95% CI, $12.89 to $14.40; 
p<0.001) on new patient office visits and $15.08 (95% CI, $13.56 to $16.60; p<0.001) on 
established patient office visits per beneficiary per quarter. On net, spending on all 
physician encounters was higher by $10.20 per beneficiary per quarter after the policy, 
controlling for pre-existing trends (95% CI, $8.58 to $11.82, p<0.001) (Table 2.2). 
These changes represented a more than doubling of spending (131 percent 
increase) on new patient office visits and a 12 percent increase in spending on established 
visits. Spending was substantially higher at baseline for established visits than for new 
visits, confirming that the former comprises the majority of physician’s face-to-face 
encounters with patients. Net spending on all encounters increased 6 percent after the 
policy. 
Figures 1A and 1B decomposes unadjusted monthly spending per beneficiary by 
category of physician specialty. Prior to the elimination of consultations, average 
spending on specialist consultations was three-fold higher than that for PCPs. 
Correspondingly, spending on new office visits to specialists saw a larger commiserate 
jump than that for PCPs in 2010 (Figure 2.1A). Spending on established patient visits 
increased for both PCPs and specialists after the policy (Figure 2.1B), driving an increase 
overall spending for both groups. The statistical model shows that 58 percent of the 
increased spending were attributable to PCP encounters, while 42 percent were for 
specialist encounters (p<0.001). 
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Table 2.2. Average spending, volume, and coded complexity of outpatient physician 
encounters before and after 2010.* 
 
 
Medicare Beneficiaries 
(N=2,247,810) 
      
   Difference (After – Before) 
  
Before 
2010 
After 
2010 Unadjusted Adjusted P value 
        
Spending ($ per beneficiary per quarter) 
All Encounters 157.04 166.74 9.7 10.20 <0.001 
Consultations 19.67 0.30 -19.37 -18.52 <0.001 
Office visits (new patient) 10.39 23.67 13.28 13.64 <0.001 
Office visits (established patient) 126.98 142.77 15.79 15.08 <0.001 
      
Volume (per 100 beneficiaries per quarter) 
All Encounters 192.4 195.3 2.9 -1.4 0.18 
Consultations 11.7 0.2 -11.5 -11.4 <0.001 
Office visits (new patient) 9.5 18.2 8.7 8.7 <0.001 
Office visits (established patient) 171.2 176.9 5.7 1.3 0.19 
      
Complexity level (1-5)      
All Encounters 3.29 3.34 0.05 0.01 <0.001 
Consultations and Office visits (new 
patient) 
 3.34 3.40 0.06 0.03 <0.001 
Office visits (established patient) 3.29 3.34 0.05 0.01 <0.001 
 
* All subjects are Medicare beneficiaries with Medicare Supplemental coverage. The centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services eliminated payment for consultation codes on January 1, 2010. 
Spending adjusted to 2010 dollars. Adjusted differences are from a model controlling for age, 
sex, CMS-HCC risk score, pre-existing trends, seasonality, and HRR fixed effects. Standard 
errors are clustered by HRR.  
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Figure 2.1. Spending on outpatient physician encounters* 
 
Panel A. 
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Fig. 2.1 (Continued) 
 
Panel B. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 shows spending per beneficiary per month in raw (unadjusted) U.S. 2010 dollars for 
physician encounters, from January 2007 through December 2010. Each type of encounter is 
decomposed into primary care physician encounters and specialist encounters. Panel A shows 
consultations and “new” patient office visits. Panel B contains “established” patient office visits 
and total spending on all encounters. The centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) 
eliminated payment for consultation codes in January 2010. The gray vertical line is drawn 
between December 2009 and January 2010 and denotes when the policy took effect.  
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2.3.2. Volume 
After Medicare’s policy took effect, the volume of consultations decreased by 
11.4 per 100 beneficiaries per quarter (p<0.001). At the same time, the volume of new 
office visits rose by 8.7 per 100 beneficiaries per quarter (p<0.001), substituting for the 
bulk of consultations that were eliminated (Table 2.2). This was consistent with 
unadjusted trends (Figure 2). The volume of established office visits increased by a 
statistically insignificant 1.3 per 100 beneficiaries per quarter (p=0.19). On net, there was 
no significant change in the total volume of encounters (-1.4 per 100 beneficiaries per 
quarter, p=0.18) (Table 2). Subgroup findings for PCPs and specialists were consistent 
with overall results. 
 
2.3.3. Complexity 
Figure 2.3 displays the discrete increase in coded complexity of encounters from 
before to after January, 2010. Because consultations were largely replaced by new patient 
office visits, these two encounters were combined in the graph, suggesting an overall 
increase in the coding level for these visits. In adjusted analyses, the statistical estimates 
show a discontinuous jump of 0.03 (p<0.001) in the average level of complexity for 
consultations and office visits, as well as an increase of 0.01 (p<0.001) in established 
office visits, after the policy took effect. On net, the magnitude of this coding effect for 
all encounters was 0.01 (p<0.001).  
Converting this coding effect to dollars, the model suggests that it was associated 
with an increase of $5.20 in spending (p<0.001). In other words, coding accounted for 
about 50 percent of the overall increase in spending. Given no significant changes in 
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volume, the results suggest that the other 50 percent of the overall spending effect was 
attributable to the administrative fee increases (the compensatory fee increase) embedded 
in the 2010 policy. 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Volume of outpatient physician encounters* 
 
 
 
* Figure 2 shows total encounter volume per beneficiary per month from January 2007 through 
December 2010. All primary care physician and specialist encounters are included. All 3 types of 
encounters are drawn on the same scale. The centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) 
eliminated payment for consultation codes in January 2010. The gray vertical line is drawn 
between December 2009 and January 2010 and denotes when the policy took effect.  
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Figure 2.3. Average coded complexity of encounters* 
 
 
 
* Figure 3 shows the average complexity of encounters from January 2007 through December 
2010. Levels of complexity range from 1 to 5. All primary care physician and specialist 
encounters are included. Consultations and “new” office visits are averaged together as the latter 
largely substitutes for the former after the policy took effect (Figure 2). The centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services (CMS) eliminated payment for consultation codes in January 2010. The 
gray vertical line is drawn between December 2009 and January 2010 and denotes when the 
policy took effect.  
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Importantly, this coding effect need not reflect “upcoding,” whereby physicians 
code at a higher than appropriate level for a given service. Given the variety of 
definitions governing the complexity of encounters (Section 2.6.3), a physician who 
codes based on time may justifiably determine that in place of a level 3 consultation (40 
minutes), an appropriate substitute is a level 4 new patient office visit (45 minutes) rather 
than a similar level 3 new patient office visit (30 minutes). For an established patient, 
only a level 5 visit offers the commiserate 40 minutes. 
 
2.4. Discussion 
 
Medicare’s elimination of consultations was associated with increased overall 
spending of about 6 percent for office encounters in 2010. This increased spending was 
not explained by changes in volume, but rather by an increased intensity of coding and 
Medicare’s compensatory fee increase for office visits in 2010. The results suggest that 
the policy did not achieve its goal of budget neutrality in 2010. Visits to PCPs explained 
about 58 percent of the overall increase in spending, suggesting that the policy was 
marginally successful in increasing Medicare payments to PCPs relative to specialists.  
There is a dearth of literature examining broad simultaneous fee cuts to specialists 
and fee increases for PCPs. In contrast to previous literature on Medicare fee cuts,
22-26
 
this analysis did not demonstrate a volume increase by specialists in response to the fee 
cut. There are several potential explanations for this finding. First, relative to their fees 
for procedures and other services, office visit fees for specialists may be low enough that 
extra volume is not profitable. I imagine this is more likely the case for procedural 
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specialists or surgeons who spend most of their time in the procedural setting, as opposed 
to cognitive specialists whose portfolio is dominated by office-based care. Any pressure 
to increase volume may have gone to other, perhaps more profitable, services. I was 
unable to systematically test for such potential “spillover” effects given other policies that 
were simultaneously in place in 2010, such as Medicare fee cuts in certain radiology and 
cardiology services which were directly impacting utilization in those services areas. 
Second, volume may have remained unchanged because coding for higher 
complexity visits (not necessarily outside boundaries of existing definitions) allowed 
physicians to make up for the fee cut. While this coding effect played a nontrivial role in 
offsetting the fee cut, the results suggest it was unlikely that physicians made up for the 
fee cut entirely through coding. 
Third, volume may not have responded because most physicians are already at 
capacity with office visits. Thus, it would be difficult to increase the number of visits 
within the work day without conceivably working longer or shortening the length of 
visits. Shorter visits would earn a lower fee all the same if the physician were coding 
based on time. On the other hand, if a physician codes based on the complexity of the 
chief complaint, history and physical exam, or medical decision making, this time 
constraint would be less binding.  
These explanations highlight the importance of the interpretation of coding 
definitions in the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule, which is widely adopted by 
commercial insurers. Policies that aim to achieve savings by targeting only the price 
(fees) component of health care spending may be susceptible to coding changes that (at 
least partially) offset its intended effects. Increased coding intensity can be difficult to 
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separate from inappropriate “upcoding,” even after adjusting for health risk scores, 
because of the flexibilities in code definitions. Given that physicians exert at least some 
degree of clinical decision making authority, fee-based policies in any underlying fee-for-
service payment system may lead to downstream coding (or even volume) effects.  
This study is subject to several limitations. First, the MarketScan Medicare 
Supplemental database contains only beneficiaries who have employer-sponsored 
Medicare supplemental (Medigap) coverage. Thus, results may not generalize to 
Medicare beneficiaries without such coverage. The Marketscan population is derived 
mostly from large employers. Employees of medium and small firms, the unemployed, 
and other Medicare beneficiaries are not represented. I was also unable to ascertain 
changes in quality, access, or other aspects of care delivery which may have changed due 
to the policy. 
In addition, the policy’s effects in the first year may not generalize to the long-
run. For example, the increased volume of PCP visits may lower future spending through 
preventive care. In addition, the policy’s simultaneous increase in office visits fees could 
have encouraged PCPs to see more complex patients and refer them less to specialists. 
This mechanism, which is not inconsistent with the results, may affect subsequent care 
patterns and spending for such patients. 
This initial evaluation of Medicare’s elimination of consultations in 2010 offers 
several potential lessons for policymakers. First, redistributing payments between 
specialties in a budget-neutral manner through fee changes alone may lead to unintended 
effects that increase overall spending. While the asymmetric fee cut to specialists in the 
consultations setting did not generate savings among specialists, policies such as the 10-
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year proposal by the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, which imposes broader 
fee changes across multiple categories of services, may produce different results. Second, 
the inherent flexibility and subjectivity of code definitions could lead to potentially 
undesirable coding behavior in response to fee-based policies. There are numerous areas 
in the fee schedule that feature a gradient of service intensities captured by a set of 
closely related codes. Third, fee cuts may be overall less effective in generating savings 
than policies that control total spending such as bundled payments, which remove overt 
incentives for offsetting fee cuts through coding or volume changes.
27,28
  
 
 
 52 
2.5. References 
 
1. Iglehart JK. Medicare Payment Reform — Proposals for Paying for an SGR Repeal. 
N Engl J Med 2011; 365:1859-1861 
2. Aaron HJ. The Central Question for Health Policy in Deficit Reduction. N Engl J 
Med 2011; 365:1655-1657. 
3. Ginsburg PB, White C. Health Care's Role in Deficit Reduction — Guiding 
Principles. N Engl J Med 2011; 365:1559-1561 
4. Chernew ME, Baicker K, Hsu J. The specter of financial armageddon--health care 
and federal debt in the United States. N Engl J Med. 2010;362:1166-8. 
5. Congressional Budget Office. Changes in Payment to Physicians. 2011 June. 
(http://www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=12240). Accessed 18 Dec 2011. 
6. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. Physician Fee Schedule: PFS Relative 
Value Files. (https://www.cms.gov/PhysicianFeeSched/PFSRVF/) 
7. Hsiao WC, Braun P, Dunn D, Becker ER. Resource-based relative values. An 
overview. JAMA. 1988 Oct 28;260(16):2347-53. 
8. Newhouse JP. Pricing the Priceless: A Health Care Conundrum. Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology Press: Cambridge, 2002. 
9. Leigh JP, Tancredi D, Jerant A, Kravitz RL. Physician wages across specialties: 
informing the physician reimbursement debate. Arch Intern Med. 2010 Oct 
25;170(19):1728-34.  
10. Lasser KE, Woolhandler S, Himmelstein DU. Sources of U.S. physician income: the 
contribution of government payments to the specialist-generalist income gap. J Gen 
Intern Med. 2008;23(9):1477-1481. 
 53 
11. Bodenheimer T, Berenson RA, Rudolf P. The primary care-specialty income gap: 
why it matters. Ann Intern Med. 2007;146(4):301-306. 
12. Hackbarth GM. Moving forward from the sustainable growth rate (SGR) system. In: 
Letter to Senators Max Baucus and Orrin G. Hatch and Representatives Dave Camp, 
Sander M. Levin, Fred Upton, and Henry A. Waxman. Washington, DC: Medicare 
Payment Advisory Commission, October 14, 2011. 
13. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Department of Health and Human 
Services. Medicare Program; Payment Policies Under the Physician Fee Schedule and 
Other Revisions to Part B for CY 2010. Federal Register 2009 Nov 25;74(226): 
61737–62206. 
14. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. CMS Manual System, Pub 100-04 
Medicare Claims Processing. Transmittal 1875. December 14, 2009. 
15. Hansen LG, Chang S. Health Research Data for the Read World: the Thomson 
Reuters Marketscan Databases. Thomson Reuters White Paper, 2010 Jan. 
(http://marketscan.thomsonreuters.com/marketscanportal/) 
16. Pope GC, Kautter J, Ellis RP, Ash AS, Ayanian JZ, Lezzoni LI, Ingber MJ, Levy JM, 
Robst J. Risk adjustment of Medicare capitation payments using the CMS-HCC 
model. Health Care Financ Rev. 2004 Summer;25(4):119-41. 
17. Fisher ES, Wennberg DE, Stukel TA, Gottlieb DJ, Lucas FL, Pinder EL. The 
implications of regional variations in Medicare spending. Part 1: the content, quality, 
and accessibility of care. Ann Intern Med. 2003 Feb 18;138(4):273-87. 
18. Welch WP, Miller ME, Welch HG, Fisher ES, Wennberg JE. Geographic variation in 
expenditures for physicians’ services in the United States. N Engl J Med. 
1993;328:621-7. 
 54 
19. Wennberg JE. The Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care 1996. Chicago: American 
Hospital Publishing; 1996. 
20. White H. A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test 
for heteroskedasticity. Econometrica 1980;48:817-30. 
21. Huber PJ. The behavior of maximum likelihood estimates under non-standard 
conditions. In: Proceedings of the Fifth Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical 
Statistics and Probability. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967:221-33. 
22. Rice TH. The Impact of Changing Medicare Reimbursement Rates on Physician-
Induced Demand. Med Care 1983. 21(8):803-15. 
23. Nguyen NX, Derrick FW. Physician Behavioral Response to a Medicare Price 
Reduction. Health Serv Res 1997. 32:3:283-98. 
24. Yip WC. Physician response to Medicare fee reductions: changes in the volume of 
coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgeries in the Medicare and private sectors. J 
Health Econ 1998. 17:675-99. 
25. Zuckerman S, Norton SA, Verrilli D. Price controls and Medicare spending: assessing 
the volume offset assumption. Med Care Res Rev. 1998 Dec;55(4):457-78. 
26. Jacobson M, Earle CC, Price M, Newhouse JP. How medicare's payment cuts for 
cancer chemotherapy drugs changed patterns of treatment. Health Aff (Millwood). 
2010 Jul;29(7):1391-9. 
27. Chernew M, Goldman D, Axeen S. How much savings can we wring from Medicare? 
N Engl J Med. 2011 Oct 6;365(14):e29. 
28. Kaiser Family Foundation. Medicare: Medicare Spending and Financing. Fact Sheet, 
August 2010. (http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/7305-05.pdf) 
 55 
2.6. Supporting Materials 
 
Contents 
 
Section 2.6.1.  Change in fees between 2009 consultations and 2010 office visits 
(the effective fee cut)  
Section 2.6.2.  Change in office visit fees from 2009 to 2010 (the compensatory 
fee increase)  
Section 2.6.3.  Definitions of clinical complexity   
Section 2.6.4.  Sensitivity analyses  
 
 
 
 56 
Section 2.6.1.  
 
Table 2.3. Change in professional fees between 2009 consultations and 2010 office visits 
(the effective fee cut)* 
 
Consultation fees in 2009 Office visit fees in 2010 
     
HCPCS code Fee ($) HCPCS code Fee ($) % Change 
     
99241 48.69 99201 (new) 38.97 -20 
(lowest complexity)  99211 (estab.) 19.12 -61 
     
99242 90.89 99202 (new) 67.11 -26 
  99212 (estab.) 38.97 -57 
     
99243 124.79 99203 (new) 97.77 -22 
  99213 (estab.) 65.30 -48 
     
99244 184.30 99204 (new) 151.89 -18 
  99214 (estab.) 97.77 -47 
     
99245 226.50 99205 (new) 190.50 -16 
(highest complexity)  99215 (estab.) 132.05 -42 
     
 
* On the left hand side are consultation codes (99241-99245) and their 2009 fees, which were 
eliminated in 2010. On the right hand side are 2010 fees for office visits, which physicians were 
instructed to substitute towards. The % change column describes the change in fees for 2010 
office visits compared to 2009 fees for consultations. Codes 99201-99205 are office visits for 
new patients. Codes 99211-99215 are office visits for established patients. All fees are national 
Payment Amounts for outpatient professional fees derived from the Medicare Part B Physician 
Fee Schedule. 
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Section 2.6.2.  
 
Table 2.4. Change in office visit fees from 2009 to 2010 (the compensatory fee 
increase)* 
 
HCPCS code 2009 Fee ($) 2010 Fee ($) % Change 
    
99201 (new) 36.79 38.97 +6 
99211 (estab.) 18.75 19.12 +2 
      
99202 (new) 63.48 67.11 +6 
99212 (estab.) 37.15 38.97 +5 
      
99203 (new) 91.97 97.77 +6 
99213 (estab.) 61.31  65.30 +7 
      
99204 (new) 141.74 151.89 +7 
99214 (estab.) 92.33  97.77 +6 
      
99205 (new) 178.89 190.50 +6 
99215 (estab.) 124.79 132.05 +6 
    
 
* This table shows the change in office visit fees from 2009 to 2010. Codes 99201-99205 are 
office visits for new patients. Codes 99211-99215 are office visits for established patients. All 
fees are national Payment Amounts for outpatient professional fees derived from the Medicare 
Part B Physician Fee Schedule. 
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Section 2.6.3.  
Table 2.5. Definitions of clinical complexity for patient encounters 
The following definitions are shared by the common procedural definition (CPT) coding system, 
used by most commercial insurers, and the Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System 
(HCPCS) used by Medicare. “Key components” and “presenting problem(s)” are identical for 
consultations, new office visits, and established office visits. 
Level of 
Complexity 
Description  
1 
Key components 
 A problem focused history; 
 A problem focused examination; and 
 Straightforward medical decision making. 
Presenting problem(s) Self limited or minor 
Time 
 Consultation (99241)—15 min 
 New office visit (99201)—10 min 
 Established office visit (99211)—5 min 
 
2 
Key components 
 An expanded problem focused history;  
 An expanded problem focused examination; and 
 Straightforward medical decision making. 
Presenting problem(s) Low severity 
Time 
 Consultation (99242)—30 min 
 New office visit (99202)—20 min 
 Established office visit (99212)—10 min 
 
3 
Key components 
 A detailed history; 
 A detailed examination; and 
 Medical decision making of low complexity. 
Presenting problem(s) Moderate severity 
Time 
 Consultation (99243)—40 min 
 New office visit (99203)—30 min 
 Established office visit (99213)—15 min 
 
4 
Key components 
 A comprehensive history; 
 A comprehensive examination; and 
 Medical decision making of moderate complexity. 
Presenting problem(s) moderate to high severity 
Time 
 Consultation (99244)—60 min 
 New office visit (99204)—45 min 
 Established office visit (99214)—25 min 
 
5 
Key components 
 A comprehensive history; 
 A comprehensive examination; and 
 Medical decision making of high complexity. 
Presenting problem(s) moderate to high severity 
Time 
 Consultation (99241)—80 min 
 New office visit (99205)—60 min 
 Established office visit (99215)—40 min 
 
  
Section 2.6.4.  
Table 2.6. Sensitivity analyses  
The following table lists interrupted time series estimates of the 2010 Medicare policy’s effect on spending and volume, by type of patient 
encounter as well as for all encounters. Column headings denote the dependent variable in the model, in units of either dollars per 
beneficiary per quarter (for spending models—columns 1-4) or volume per 100 beneficiaries per quarter (volume models—columns 5-8). 
The base model results (row 1) are compared to results from sensitivity analyses (rows 2-6). Sensitivity analyses are alterations from the 
base model. P values are in parentheses. 
 
 
Adjusted change in spending  
($ per beneficiary per quarter) 
Adjusted change in volume  
(per 100 beneficiaries per quarter) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
 
All 
Encounters Consults 
New office 
visits 
Established 
office visits 
All 
Encounters Consults 
New office 
visits 
Established 
office visits 
Base model 10.20 
(p<0.001) 
-18.52 
(p<0.001) 
13.64 
(p<0.001) 
15.08 
(p<0.001) 
-1.4 
(p=0.18) 
-11.4 
(p<0.001) 
8.7 
(p<0.001) 
1.3 
(p=0.19) 
Omit quarter 
indicators 
9.43 
(p<0.001) 
-18.37 
(p<0.001) 
13.82 
(p<0.001) 
13.97 
(p<0.001) 
-1.4 
(p=0.18) 
-11.4 
(p<0.001) 
8.7 
(p<0.001) 
1.3 
(p=0.19) 
Omit HRR 
indicators 
10.69 
(p<0.001) 
-18.46 
(p<0.001) 
13.69 
(p<0.001) 
15.46 
(p<0.001) 
-3.4 
(p<0.001) 
-11.7 
(p<0.001) 
8.3 
(p<0.001) 
0.0 
(p=0.85) 
Omit linear 
trend 
8.39 
(p<0.001) 
-19.39 
(p<0.001) 
13.22 
(p<0.001) 
14.56 
(p<0.001) 
3.0 
(p=0.002) 
-11.5 
(p<0.001) 
8.6 
(p<0.001) 
5.9 
(p<0.001) 
Omit age, sex, 
and risk score 
8.86 
(p<0.001) 
-18.56 
(p<0.001) 
13.65 
(p<0.001) 
13.77 
(p<0.001) 
-5.2 
(p<0.001) 
-11.7 
(p<0.001) 
8.3 
(p<0.001) 
-1.9 
(p=0.04) 
Continuous 4-
year enrollees 
9.93 
(p<0.001) 
-18.60 
(p<0.001) 
13.53 
(p<0.001) 
15.00 
(p<0.001) 
-2.6 
(p<0.001) 
-11.6 
(p<0.001) 
8.4 
(p<0.001) 
0.5 
(p=0.42) 
 
5
9
 
 60 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Competitive bidding in Medicare Advantage:  
Effect of benchmark changes on plan bids* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* A version of this chapter has been submitted for publication. Please do not circulate. 
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3.1. Introduction  
 
Bidding is one of the most important price-setting mechanisms in economics. It is 
central to auctions, which are commonly used to set prices in the absence of a preexisting 
market (Hansen, 1988; Vickrey, 1961). A large body of theoretical work has 
demonstrated that the outcome of markets that use bidding to set prices depends, in part, 
on the nature of competition in the market (McAfee and McMillan, 1987; Klemperer, 
1999). This has been followed by a growing empirical literature on auctions (Athey and 
Haile, 2006; Hendricks and Porter, 2007). Bidding is especially important in shaping 
government procurement contracts for the delivery of public services through the private 
sector (Laffont and Tirole, 1993; Bajari and Tadelis, 2001). In recent years, this context 
for bidding has assumed an increasingly central role in health care, in particular the 
United States Medicare Program. The Medicare Part D prescription drug market, the 
market for durable medical equipment, and the Medicare Advantage, in which 
commercial insurers contract with Medicare to provide alternative insurance options to 
standard Medicare Part A and Part B coverage for Medicare beneficiaries, all use bidding 
as a way to set price. 
Increasingly, proposals to control Medicare spending center on competitive 
bidding as a market based alternative to administratively imposed payment reduction 
(Antos, 2012; Wilensky, 2012). Competitive bidding is the foundation of a recent 
legislative proposal by Paul Ryan (R-WI) and Ron Wyden (D-OR)—the Ryan-Wyden 
Plan—which proposes replacing traditional fee-for-service Medicare with an expanded 
bidding system (Wyden and Ryan, 2011). Some analysts predict that expanding the role 
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of bidding in Medicare could save $339 billion or 9.5 percent of Medicare spending 
through 2020 (5.6 percentage points more than projected savings under the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act) (Feldman, Coulam, and Dowd, 2012). Yet despite 
the importance of bidding, there is little empirical work to date on plan bidding behavior 
in MA. 
In the MA bidding system, any commercial insurer that would like to offer an MA 
plan submits a plan-specific bid (an amount covering the expected costs of a standard 
benefit package for an average risk beneficiary) to the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS). This bid, which must also be accompanied by projected 
enrollment in the counties covered by the plan, is measured against county-level 
benchmark rates set by CMS. From the bid and projected enrollment, CMS determines a 
plan-specific payment. Competition gives plans an incentive to bid low in order to attract 
consumers. Low bids are salient to beneficiaries through higher “rebates” (additional 
coverage benefits or reduced cost sharing for Medicare Part B or Part D), upon which 
beneficiaries’ enrollment decisions are based. As a result, MA plans compete on the basis 
of price (premiums) and benefits. Given that benchmark rate-setting is the central policy 
tool for Medicare, this paper examines the following question: How do bids change in 
response to changes in benchmark payment rates?  
Understanding the relationship between county-level benchmark rates and plan 
bids is also important for impending changes under current law. In 2012, the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act will begin phasing in a modification of the 
benchmark rate formula that will likely have substantial effects on plan behavior and MA 
enrollment. Designed to reduce excessive payments to MA plans, benchmarks will be set 
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as a percentage of average fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare spending in a county, with the 
percentage determined by how a county’s FFS spending compares with that of other 
counties (MedPAC, 2011). Counties in the highest quartile of FFS spending will face 
benchmarks equal to 95 percent of average risk-adjusted FFS spending in their region; 
those in the lowest quartile will face benchmarks equal to 115 percent. Since MA plans 
are concentrated in the highest spending counties, resulting benchmarks may have large 
impacts on plan rebates and subsequent MA enrollment. 
We study the relationship between benchmark rates and plan bids using plan 
payment, enrollment, and county FFS spending data from the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) for the period 2006-2009. The basic strategy is to use a 
longitudinal model to assess the effect of changes in benchmark rates on changes in plan 
bids. Since plans locate across multiple counties, I aggregate the data to the “market” 
level using a weighted average of county level benchmark rates across the counties that 
each plan enters. I find evidence that bids move with changes in benchmark rates, 
suggesting that plans do not strictly bid costs. Moreover, I find that plan rebates also 
move with benchmark rates, but to a lesser degree than bids, suggesting that plans invest 
part of the extra dollars generated by a higher benchmark on rebates to attract enrollees 
and retain the rest as profit. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background on the MA 
program and its competitive bidding system. Section 3 reviews the theory of price-setting 
in the MA context under perfect and imperfect information. Section 4 describes the data 
and section 5 presents the empirical strategy. Results are shown in section 6, and section 
7 concludes. 
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Figure 3.1. Growth in Medicare Advantage enrollment, 1994-2011. 
 
 
 
Source: Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (2011). A Data Book: Health care 
spending and the Medicare Program, June 2011. Section 9, p. 147. 
 
 
3.2. Background 
 
More than 25 percent of Medicare beneficiaries today are enrolled in MA. In the 
last decade, MA enrollment has more than doubled from 4.5 million in 2003 to 11.4 
million in 2010 (MedPAC 2011), its highest level since the inception of the program 
(Figure 3.1). During this time, MA has commanded increasing policy interest, with 
growing implications for the trajectory of Medicare spending as well as beneficiary 
access and quality of care (Gold, 2012; Guram and Moffit, 2012). Beginning in 2006 MA 
plan payments were determined via a competitive bidding system, which sought to 
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leverage market forces to encourage more efficient and higher quality plan options 
(McGuire, Newhouse, and Sinaiko, 2011).  
The MA program, formerly known as Medicare Part C and Medicare+Choice, 
provides Medicare beneficiaries the choice of health insurance plans that provide 
Medicare coverage offered by commercial insurers in lieu of traditional FFS Medicare. 
Private insurers in MA accept prospective payments that vary at the county level and 
agree to provide coverage for Medicare Part A and Part B services. Plans may also supply 
prescription drug, or Medicare Part D, coverage. Commercial plans that enter MA 
compete in a regulated market. The original motivation of the 1982 Tax Equity and Fiscal 
Responsibility Act (TEFRA), which ushered in managed care plans in Medicare, was to 
encourage private plans to improve efficiency and lower Medicare spending. Another 
important tenet was giving beneficiaries choice to choose the best plan that fits their 
needs. Plans have flexibility to contract with providers, use managed care techniques, and 
design beneficiary incentives. 
A number of studies have examined the relationship between plan payments and 
MA enrollment (see, for example, Atherly et al., 2004; Cawley et al., 2005; Dowd et al., 
2003; Gowrisankaran and Town, 2006; Maruyama, 2011; Town and Liu, 2003). They use 
different datasets across varying time horizons and different estimation techniques, and 
find largely heterogeneous elasticities of MA enrollment with respect to plan payments. 
In addition, several studies find that payment rates affect the number of HMO plans that 
enter the market (Cawley et al., 2002; Town and Liu, 2003; Pizer and Frakt, 2002). 
However, most of this literature predates the introduction of competitive bidding in 2006. 
Since there, there is little work on the relationship between benchmarks and enrollment 
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(Chernew et al., 2008), and virtually no work on the effect of benchmarks on plan 
bidding or plan rebates, largely owing to the lack of available data. 
 
3.2.1. Competitive bidding in Medicare Advantage 
 
The Medicare bidding system can be summarized in the following four steps 
(Figure 3.2). Let j denote plans and k denote counties. 
 
(1)  CMS sets a benchmark payment rate for each county, benchk. The benchmark is a 
function of lagged fee-for-service spending and a series of update rules, such as a 
minimal update factor and county floor payment rates. 
 
(2)  Each plan j submits a single sealed bid, bidj, and projected enrollment in counties the 
plan will serve. 
 
(3)  After reviewing a plan’s bid and projected enrollment, CMS assigns plans a plan-
specific payment benchmark, Benchj. This payment benchmark is an average of 
county benchmark rates weighted by projected plan enrollment across counties.  
 
Together, the plan payment benchmark (Benchj) and plan bid (bidj) determine the 
rebate or premium that a plan will offer or charge enrollees, respectively. If the 
plan’s bid exceeds its benchmark, the plan payment (payj) equals its payment 
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benchmark and the plan must collect the difference through enrollee premiums 
(premiumj).  
 
Case 1: bidj > Benchj 
 payj = Benchj (1) 
 premiumj = bidj – Benchj (2) 
 
On the other hand, if the plan’s bid is less than its payment benchmark, the plan 
receives its bid. In addition, it receives 75 percent of the difference between its 
payment benchmark and bid as a rebate (rebatej), which it must return to enrollees. 
There are no premiums charged to enrollees. The rebate may comprise of extra 
benefits (such as dental and vision care) or lower Part B or Part D premiums. 
Essentially the rebate is a negative premium. The remaining 25 percent of the 
difference is retained by Medicare as an effective tax (Figure 2).  
 
Case 2: bidj < Benchj 
 payj = bidj + rebatej = bidj + 0.75(Benchj–bidj) (3) 
 premiumj = 0 (4) 
 
(4)  Given a set of plan options, which differ in premiums and rebates, Medicare 
beneficiaries choose to enroll in a plan (or in traditional Medicare). The beneficiary’s 
enrollment can be modeled as a discrete choice function and is outside the scope of 
the current paper. 
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Figure 3.2. The relationships between the benchmark, bid, and payment.* 
 
 
* Medicare Advantage plans submit a price (bid) that they are willing to accept from Medicare 
for insuring a beneficiary. Plan payments are determined by comparing the bid to a “benchmark” 
payment rate set by CMS based on the counties the plan serves. If a plan bids above the 
benchmark it faces, the plan receives only the benchmark amount and must collect the difference 
by charging a premium to enrollees. If a plan bids below the benchmark, it receives its bid plus 75 
percent of the difference between the bid and benchmark—a “rebate”—which the plan must 
return to beneficiaries in the form of lower premiums or additional benefits. The lower the bid, 
the higher the rebate that plans may use to attract beneficiaries. For more details of the bidding 
system, see: Medicare Payment Advisory Commission. Medicare Advantage Program Payment 
System: Payment Basics. October 2008, Figure 2 (p. 3). 
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3.3. Theory  
 
Unlike a typical first-price sealed bid auction, bidding in MA does not have the 
winner-take-all feature. Instead, the MA bidding system is simply a way to set plan 
payments and premiums. There are many ways to design a bidding system, and different 
models of competition generate different predictions. I highlight a benchmark case 
below.  
 
3.3.1. Perfect competition (Bertrand pricing) 
 
In the standard case of perfect competition, assume MA plans maximize a simple 
profit function characterized by markups (price above cost) and enrollment (quantity 
demanded). 
 
 πj = Σk(pj-cjk)njk = Σk(pj-cjk)sjkmk (5) 
 
where pj equals bid if the bid is less than the benchmark, cjk denotes plan costs by county 
(which may be endogenous), and njk is plan enrollment by county. Note that pj does not 
vary by county as plans receive a single price. Enrollment can be expressed as the 
product of the plan’s market share in a county, sjk, and the number of Medicare 
beneficiaries in a county, mk.  
Under perfect competition, products are perfect substitutes and sellers engage in 
sharp price competition. Each sets its price simultaneously and non-cooperatively, and 
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the lowest price taking the whole market. In equilibrium, competition forces bids down to 
plan costs (bidj = cj), and plan profit is zero (πj = 0). Any exogenous change in the 
benchmark can be modeled as a shift in demand. For example, in the case where the bid 
exceeds the benchmark, a 1 dollar increase in benchmark will reduce the premium 
charged to beneficiaries by one dollar. For bids below the benchmark, a 1 dollar increase 
in benchmark will increase the rebate (e.g. negative premium) by 75 cents. Because the 
majority of plans (over 90%) bid below the benchmark, this is the dominant case. In any 
model of perfect competition, the impact of a change in benchmark on the bid will 
depend on the slope of the supply curve. There is some evidence that suggests the supply 
curve in the health insurance industry is flat. 
This simple model of perfect competition, however, may not be realistic. For 
example, it implies that anytime such competition exists, a plan pricing marginally lower 
than competitors will capture all market demand. The model also assumes no friction 
(search or switching costs) on the demand side, implying that beneficiaries can freely 
switch between plans. In addition, it assumes plan costs are a function of beneficiary 
characteristics. If health providers react to a benchmark increase by demanding higher 
reimbursement, the supply curve would be upwards sloping. In other words, the 
predictions are specific to a world with no provider market power. 
 
3.3.2. Imperfect competition (Nash pricing) 
 
Many models deviate from perfect competition. The theory of differentiated 
products oligopoly offers one view, where products are not perfect substitutes and their 
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differentiability confers market power to their suppliers. The classic duopoly theory is 
attributed to Dixit (1979). In this classic theory with constant marginal costs, Bertrand 
competition yields lower prices and higher welfare than Cournot competition. If goods 
are substitutes, supplier profits are lower under Bertrand competition than under Cournot. 
If goods are complements, Bertrand profits are higher. Thus, the firm’s dominant strategy 
is to choose quantity as its strategic variable when the goods are substitutes, and to 
choose price when the goods are complements (Singh and Vives 1984). 
In the MA context, one can consider what the optimal markups should be in a 
standard industrial organizations framework. Given differentiated products, plans 
maximize their profits taking other insurers’ prices (bids) as given. The solution depends 
on the elasticity of demand, nature of competition, and the share of the difference 
between the bid and the benchmark rate returned to Medicare (25 percent under current 
law). Benchmark rates affect bids because they shift the demand curve. For example, if a 
plan’s equilibrium net benefit package to enrollees is x*, and the benchmark increases, 
the optimal plan bid to achieve x* may also rise. This exemplifies the standard result 
from models of imperfect competition. In the short run, a shift in demand will increase 
prices even if the marginal cost curve is perfectly elastic. 
Another potential source of imperfect competition arises in the provider market. 
Specifically, provider market power may affect plan bids. Unlike Medicare, which sets its 
prices, commercial insurers negotiate prices with providers. Provider market power can 
generate wide variations in commercial insurer prices even within local markets; a good 
example is Eastern Massachusetts (Office of the Massachusetts Attorney General, 2010). 
CMS benchmark rates may affect MA plans’ reservation provider fees. If providers know 
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that plans will receive higher benchmarks, they may negotiate for higher fees to extract a 
part of that rent. On the other hand, benchmark rates also affect enrollment, which is 
directly related to insurer market power. Thus, greater enrollment through increased net 
benefits (following from increased benchmarks) could lower provider fees.  
 
3.4. Data 
 
We used public CMS databases containing MA plan payment data at both the 
county and plan level from 2006-2009. I also used county-level published benchmark 
rates and actual FFS costs per beneficiary. Benchmarks in year t are derived by trending 
average county FFS spending from year t-8 to year t-3 forward using the growth rate in 
that 5-year period. In addition, I used public CMS databases on plan location and 
enrollment by county in each year. I merged these public datasets to create market-level 
data, as described below.  
The county-level data contains average plan payments, rebates, and county risk 
scores. Risk scores are the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Hierarchical 
Condition Category (CMS-HCC) risk scores. The plan-level data contains plan payments, 
rebates, and plan risk scores. The plan’s payment rate is the plan’s bid standardized to a 
beneficiary of 1.0 risk. When plans submit a bid to CMS, they submit a bid based on the 
expected risk profile of their enrollees as expected enrollment in the counties they serve. 
CMS subsequently converts this bid to a standardized bid, which is what I use in the 
analyses. Published county benchmark payment rates are drawn from the MA Ratebook. 
Specifically, they are the overall “risk” rates for each county, standardized to a 
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beneficiary of 1.0 risk. County level realized FFS costs up to 2009 are also available 
online through CMS. Like the prior variables, these costs are standardized to the 1.0 risk 
enrollee. Enrollment is the total number of beneficiaries enrolled in a MA plan.  
We restrict analysis to local plans, which use the same county benchmarks. 
Specifically, I conduct these analyses at three levels of plan aggregation: health 
maintenance organization (HMOs) only, HMOs and local preferred provider organization 
plans (LPPOs), and HMOs, LPPOs, and private fee-for-service plans (PFFS). Employer 
plans and special needs plans are excluded, as are regional PPO plans that use different 
regional benchmarks. 
 
3.5. Empirical strategy 
 
3.5.1. Level of analysis 
 
Both county-level and plan-level analyses of the relationship between benchmark 
rates and bids are inherently limited. Because MA plans are required to submit a single 
bid covering all counties they serve, relating the county benchmark to average bid in any 
given county ignores the effect of benchmarks in other (often adjacent) counties which 
may have affected the given county’s bid. Alternatively, a plan-level longitudinal model 
requires plans to be a stable unit of observation across time. Yet insurers frequently 
consolidate or split their plans from one year to the next. For example, a “silver” plan’s 
enrollees in one year may be subsumed under a “gold” plan in the next year, retaining the 
gold plan’s identification number. Alternative scenarios are also common. The two plans 
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offered by the same insurer may merge and take on a new identification number 
altogether. Subsequently, this consolidated plan may split in the next year. Such plan 
dynamics complicate longitudinal fixed effects models with plans as the unit of the 
observation. 
To combat these limitations, I constructed, for each county, an effective “market” 
that takes into account the benchmarks in other counties that plans observe when making 
their bids in the given county. Each unique market is centered on a unique county, with 
market boundaries defined by the set of other counties served at any point in the study 
period by plans in the central counties. Like counties, they are a stable unit of analysis 
over time, allowing for longitudinal models. Specifically, I constructed markets from 
plan- and county-level data in three steps.  
First, for each county, I identified all other counties served by plans in the target 
county. In each year I examine the distribution of enrollment across counties for all plans 
serving the target county. Second, I assigned the county benchmark payment rate in all 
non-target counties to the target county, weighted by the share of each of the target 
county plan’s enrollment in the non-target counties. I used each plan’s average share 
across the study period so that the weights were stable. This procedure was repeated for 
other variables. The resulting units of observation, which I call “markets,” are stable over 
time, allowing for longitudinal models. There is the same number of markets as counties. 
Each observation in the final dataset is a unique market-year, and I will refer to them as 
markets in the rest of the paper.  
 
3.5.2. Empirical model 
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We estimate the effect of changes in benchmark rates on changes in plan bids 
using the following reduced form county-level model:  
 
bidkt = β1benchkt + β2FFS_TMkt + β3risk_TMkt + β4risk_MAkt + β5insurerskt  
β6populationkt + λk + τt + εkt (6) 
 
where bidkt is the average bid in market k in year t, benchkt is the market-level published 
benchmark rate in year t, and FFS_TMkt is the actual realized (contemporaneous) FFS 
costs of the county’s traditional Medicare (TM) population. I also control for health status 
through the CMS-HCC risk score: risk_TMkt is the average risk score of the county’s TM 
population, and risk_MAkt is the average risk score of the county’s MA population. In 
addition, I include the number of insurers in a county and the total population of 
Medicare eligible persons in a county. County fixed effects are represented by λk and year 
fixed effects by τt. County fixed effects render the identification of the effect of 
benchmark rates on bids through within-county changes. This specification is preferable 
to cross-sectional or pooled OLS to the extent that benchmark rates are correlated with 
unobservable county-level characteristics that also affect plan bids. Year fixed effects 
control for any underlying trends in bids across all counties. In the base model, the error 
term εkt is assumed to be uncorrelated with the independent variables. I address the 
potential endogeneity of the error term below. Observations are weighted by a fixed 
average of the total Medicare population in a county across 2006-2009. Given that 
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markets overlap geographically, standard errors are clustered by state rather than by 
county.  
To test the robustness of this base model, I begin with a number of basic 
sensitivity analyses. To assess the impact of selection effects, I repeat the model while 
omitting TM risk or plan risk. I then repeat analyses using a linear trend in place of year 
dummies. Next, I repeat the model omitting fixed county weights and restricting attention 
to big counties. I also include an interaction between benchmark and the number of 
insurers. Finally, to control for provider market power, I include a Herfindahl–Hirschman 
Index (HHI) based on the number of hospital beds in a county in one specification, and 
present an additional specification with the HHI and the interaction between HHI and 
benchmark. 
Since I exploit variation in benchmark changes, which are in dollars in the base 
model, I also explore a model in which I logarithmically transform bids and benchmarks. 
Variation in dollars may arise even when the percent change in the benchmarks are the 
same—for example when multiple counties with different base benchmarks receive the 
same minimum update of 2 percent or national traditional Medicare growth rate in a 
given year. The log-transformed model is a generalized linear model (GLM) which 
allows a more flexible functional form and removes the need to smear the estimates, 
which is required in the OLS case. I transform the predictions of the GLM into dollars 
and find that they are very consistent with the base model. 
 
3.5.3. Potential endogeneity 
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Despite controlling for county FFS costs, the error term in equation (6) may be 
correlated with the benchmark. There may be unobservable time-varying county 
characteristics that are correlated with the benchmark and bid. In particular, I are 
concerned about omitted plan costs in the error term, εkt. Since I run a longitudinal model 
with county fixed effects, I can express the terms in equation (6) as changes, where 
FFS_MAkt is the average plan costs in a county. 
 
Δbidkt = β1Δbenchkt + …+ Δεkt (7) 
Δbidkt = β1Δbenchkt + …+ Δ(FFS_MAkt + μkt) (8) 
 
Since the benchmark in year t is calculated using a linear projection of the 
county’s FFS spending in a 5-year period from t-8 to t-3, I can express ΔBenchkt as the 
following 
 
Δbenchkt = benchkt – benchk,t-1  (9) 
Δbenchkt = f(FFS_TMk,t-3, …, FFS_TMk,t-8) – f(FFS_TMk,t-4, …, FFS_TMk,t-9) (10) 
 
Thus, it is clear from equation (10) that there are 4 overlapping years, FFS_TMk,t-4 
through FFS_TMk,t-8, which determine the benchmarks in both year t and t-1. Thus, the 
concern is whether the omitted variable—the change in plan costs from year t to t-1—is 
correlated with a function of the FFS costs in year t-3 and t-9. 
 
Δbenchkt = g(FFS_TMk,t-3, FFS_TMk,t-9) (11) 
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We address this potential endogeneity in several ways, including using 
instrumental variables and assessing the sensitivity to omitting FFS costs (which should 
increase the bias if omitted costs I a large concern). I also estimate models on 2006-2007 
and 2008-2009 separately, because payment updates in those years (“rebasing years”) 
were dominated by legislative changes to payment floors that are plausibly more 
exogenous. 
 
3.5.4. Instrumental variables 
 
In order to address this bias, I use simulated benchmark rates to identify the effect 
of changes in benchmarks on bids. I would expect OLS estimates of β to be biased 
upwards if bids tend to increase more in areas where benchmarks increase more. On the 
other hand, β would be biased towards zero if changes in benchmark changes have an 
inverse relationship with changes in bids. With imperfect competition, I might expect 
bids to increase more in areas greater benchmark increases, which offer greater rents to 
be captured by the plan or providers. 
We construct simulated benchmarks by isolating the plausibly exogenous portion 
of benchmark updates in each year, and using that portion to update the (simulated) 
benchmark from the previous year. From 2006-2009, benchmarks were updated by the 
maximum value of 4 different paths: (1) a minimum update of 2 percent, (2) the national 
FFS Medicare growth rate, (3) the county FFS growth rate, or (4) an urban or rural floor 
update. Since the county’s own FFS growth rate (path 3) is potentially endogenous, I 
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abolish this criterion and replace it with the FFS growth rate of the entire state that a 
given county belongs to, calculated using a weighted average of county growth rates in 
all counties in that state except the given county. One caveat, however, is that a state-
level growth rate update contains, for any given target county, spending in non-target 
counties, which are often in the same state. Therefore, a simulated benchmark that 
undergoes this “state-not-self” update will likely be correlated with the error term in the 
second stage model. Empirically, the state-not-self path is invoked rarely (133 counties 
were updated via this path in 2007, and 159 counties in 2009). Overall, to the extent that 
simulated benchmarks are correlated with observed benchmarks but uncorrelated with the 
error, the IV estimate would represent an improvement over the base OLS estimate.  
While the effect of simulated benchmark changes on bids may be less related to 
the error term, simulated benchmarks may still be a weak instrument if simulated updates 
are uncorrelated with actual benchmark updates. I test the strength of the instrument 
using a standard F-test, which strongly rejects the hypothesis that simulated benchmarks 
are uncorrelated with the actual benchmarks.  
 
3.6. Results 
 
3.6.1. Descriptive analysis 
 
From 2006-2009, there were a total of 11,500 unique Medicare Advantage plans. 
After excluding regional PPOs, special needs plans, and employer-sponsored plans, 
Figure 3.3 shows the number of HMO, LPPO, and PFFS plans in each year. While less 
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managed plans have grown in recent years, HMO plans remain the dominant plan type. I 
focus on HMO plans in the main analyses, which are also the dominant plan type in the 
most populated regions on the country. While 2010 is included in this descriptive 
analysis, I exclude it from the econometric analysis because actual realized FFS costs are 
not yet available for 2010. Figure 3.4 shows the population-weighted average market 
benchmark rates and average HMO plan bids. In econometric analysis, the identification 
comes from comparing how bids change in markets with large benchmark changes to 
how they change in markets with small benchmark changes.  
 
Figure 3.3. Number of Medicare Advantage plans, 2006-2010 
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Figure 3.4. Average market benchmarks and bids, 2006-2009 
 
 
 
Population-weighted average published benchmark rates and plan bids at the market level 
standardized to a beneficiary of 1.0 risk, with interquartile range (2012 U.S. dollars).  
 
 
3.6.2. Econometric results 
 
We find a positive and robust effect of benchmark changes on changes in plan 
bids. Table 3.1 presents the main OLS estimates and sensitivity analyses for HMO plan 
markets. I find in the base specification (column 1) that a one dollar increase in the 
benchmark leads to a $0.50 increase in bids. This result is largely robust to sensitivity 
analyses. Omitting plan enrollee risk or FFS beneficiary risk did not appreciably change 
the main estimate, which suggests that differential selection did not play a major role 
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(columns 2-3). Models using a linear yearly trend, omitting the fixed population weights, 
and restricting attention to large markets also produced estimates near $0.50 (columns 4-
6).  
We find a fairly consistently negative effect of competition (number of insurers) 
on bids across different specifications. I would expect this finding given that plans have 
an incentive to bid low in order to offer a higher rebate (extra benefits) to attract 
enrollees. On average, each market had 12.1 insurers in 2009, up from 7.9 in 2006, 
suggesting overall competition increased over these years. Analogously, the average 
number of insurers in a county (disaggregated from the market-level analysis) grew from 
5.7 to 10.2 over this period, giving a sense of the overlap of counties within markets. 
However, this independent effect largely goes away when I include an interaction 
between the number of insurers and benchmark (column 7). The negative sign on the 
interaction term, while small in magnitude and marginally significant, suggests that bids 
are less responsive to benchmarks in areas with more insurers. This is consistent with the 
interpretation of the positive relationship between bids and benchmarks being a sign of 
imperfect competition.  
We also find that the relationship between risk in the MA plans and benchmarks 
is consistently negative, though generally not statistically significant.  The negative 
coefficient is consistent with the notion that the cost advantage of MA plans rises with 
beneficiary risk. Thus, MA plans would be paid more to care for higher risk enrollees 
than they need. Since plan bids are for a standard enrollee, and plans are paid more if 
they attract sicker enrollees, plans would be able to bid lower if they anticipated 
attracting a sicker population.  
  
Table 3.1. Main estimates and sensitivity analyses (market-level model). 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Base No county risk No plan risk Linear year Unweighted Large markets Interaction HHI HHI*bench 
                    
Benchmark 0.495*** 0.494*** 0.486*** 0.533*** 0.422*** 0.523*** 0.593*** 0.464*** 0.526*** 
 
(0.0546) (0.0549) (0.0541) (0.0482) (0.0633) (0.0487) (0.0707) (0.0509) (0.0676) 
Risk (FFS) -10.25 
 
-12.20 -29.88* -5.712 -9.850 -10.07 -8.776 -8.660 
 
(16.43) 
 
(17.15) (15.14) (13.74) (17.00) (16.28) (16.24) (16.31) 
Risk (Plan) -28.91 -31.44 
 
-49.83** -21.24 -26.71 -32.38 -28.75 -27.85 
 
(22.15) (23.03) 
 
(20.80) (19.95) (23.16) (22.17) (22.12) (21.98) 
FFS cost 0.0585 0.0557 0.0570 0.0596 0.130** 0.0384 0.0683 0.0611 0.0591 
 
(0.0478) (0.0470) (0.0475) (0.0450) (0.0618) (0.0447) (0.0490) (0.0456) (0.0449) 
Pop (1000s) -0.00835 -0.00670 -0.00940 -0.000994 0.0394 -0.0125 -0.00327 -0.0265 -0.0291 
 
(0.0362) (0.0368) (0.0359) (0.0366) (0.0352) (0.0365) (0.0353) (0.0393) (0.0391) 
Insurers -1.173*** -1.181*** -1.208*** -1.436*** -1.812*** -1.082*** 2.509 -0.983*** -1.013*** 
 
(0.285) (0.289) (0.285) (0.289) (0.347) (0.283) (2.122) (0.296) (0.318) 
Insurers*Bench 
      
-0.00423*     
       
(0.00248)     
HHI (beds) 
      
  -0.00825*** 0.0206 
       
  (0.00272) (0.0232) 
HHI*Bench 
      
    -3.26e-05 
       
    (2.48e-05) 
Market FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y 
 
Y Y Y Y Y 
Year (linear) 
   
4.038** 
  
      
    
(1.583) 
  
      
Constant 307.3*** 302.3*** 290.3*** -7,779** 306.8*** 294.3*** 217.9*** 346.0*** 292.5*** 
 
(45.96) (45.19) (47.00) (3,168) (46.19) (44.95) (63.19) (44.80) (67.25) 
Observations 6,036 6,036 6,036 6,036 6,036 4,280 6,036 6,036 6,036 
R-squared 0.360 0.359 0.358 0.332 0.317 0.373 0.363 0.367 0.368 
Markets 2,013 2,013 2,013 2,013 2,013 1,447 2,013 2,013 2,013 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by state. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
8
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We find that bids are inversely related to provider market HHI (column 8). The 
HHI is a measure of provider concentration in a market, with higher HHI representing 
greater concentration (or less competition). Having more providers in a market (lower 
HHI) may lead to higher costs because providers compete on expensive services (i.e. the 
medical arms race). However, the HHI is not correlated to the relationship between 
benchmark and bid (column 9). The effect of benchmark changes on bids is largely 
robust to the inclusion of provider market HHI and the HHI-benchmark interaction.  
The coefficient on benchmark in the logarithmically transformed GLM model 
indicated that a 1 percent increase in benchmark leads to a 0.62 percent (S.E. 0.07) 
increase in bids (not shown). Transforming this estimate into dollars gives a prediction of 
$0.52, consistent with the base model and sensitivity analyses. As a further sensitivity 
analysis, I estimated a similar set of longitudinal models at the plan level on the subset of 
continuously existing plans (stable plans with the same identification number) over the 4 
years. Results are largely consistent with market-level models (Table 3.2).  
In the supporting materials section, I present analogous main estimates and 
sensitivity analyses when LPPO and PFFS plans are included in the market. In general, I 
find that the effect of benchmark changes on bids is attenuated ($0.47 with LPPOs, $0.34 
with LPPOs and PFFS) when less managed plans are included in the analysis. These 
plans, particularly PFFS plans, are largely located in small or rural counties. 
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Table 3.2. Additional sensitivity analyses (plan-level model).* 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
HMO HMO and HMO, PPO, 
 
only PPO and PFFS 
       
Benchmark ($) 0.605*** 0.612*** 0.620*** 
 
(0.131) (0.125) (0.118) 
    Plan enrollee CMS-HCC 
risk score 
12.75 11.75 38.24** 
(19.23) (18.18) (18.88) 
    Fee-for-service Medicare 
cost ($) 
-0.0328 -0.0271 -0.00640 
(0.0291) (0.0281) (0.0274) 
    Number of enrollees 0.223 0.170 0.158 
 
(0.290) (0.323) (0.287) 
    Number of competing 1.033 0.964 1.502 
insurers (1.126) (1.072) (0.989) 
    
Benchmark * 
competitors -0.00109 -0.00103 -0.00163 
 (0.00131) (0.00125) (0.00116) 
    Plan FE Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y 
    
Constant 199.0 196.1 145.0 
 (130.5) (125.1) (115.9) 
    Observations 2,436 3,140 3,432 
R-squared 0.467 0.453 0.471 
Number of plans 609 785 858 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by plan. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
* These sensitivity analyses use longitudinal plan-level models. Thus, each model includes plan indicators 
(plan fixed effects). Only stable plans (those existing in each year from 2006-2009) were included. Each 
model was also weighted by plan enrollment size. Column (1) consists of HMO plans only. Column (2) 
adds local PPO plans to the sample. Column (3) includes all plans (HMO, local PPO, and PFFS). Standard 
errors are clustered at the plan level. 
 
 86 
3.6.3. Sensitivity analyses related to endogeneity 
 
Our major concern is that the change in benchmark is related to unobserved 
changes in costs. This is unlikely because I condition on actual FFS costs and the 
benchmark is related to lagged costs.  Nevertheless, the correlation between benchmark 
levels and FFS cost levels is 0.68. However, the correlation of changes in benchmarks 
and changes in FFS costs is 0.36. This is similar to the correlation of the residuals of 
benchmarks and FFS costs (0.37). I conduct several sensitivity analyses to explore the 
potential bias due to such endogeneity.  
Table 3.3 shows the main sensitivity tests related to endogeneity, with the base 
model replicated in column 1. First, I estimate the base model omitting actual FFS costs 
(column 2). If benchmark changes were strongly related to costs, I would expect that 
omission of FFS costs to create a stronger bias and affect the coefficient. Yet, when I 
omit FFS costs, the benchmark effect on bids is only slightly larger ($0.53).  
Second, in 2006-2007 and 2008-2009, the updating of benchmarks underwent a 
“rebasing,” which is required by law to occur at least once every three years. The 
rebasing of benchmarks differentially increases lower benchmarks by more than higher 
ones, but is less likely tied to the annual change in costs. When I repeat the base model on 
just the 2006-2007 data, the effect of changes in benchmarks on bids is $0.54 (S.E. = 
$0.10) (column 3). Similarly, restricting the model to the 2008-09 data produces an effect 
of $0.56 (S.E. = $0.06) (column 4). The 2008-2009 period is particularly relevant because 
benchmark updates in 2060 of the approximately 3200 counties were determined by 
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changes in floor payments, which are most likely exogenous to market level changes in 
cost.  
Finally, the IV estimate closely approximates the base model estimate, 
demonstrating that a dollar increase in benchmarks leads to about a $0.48 increase in bids 
and suggesting that the OLS estimate may be biased somewhat upwards (column 5).  
 
Table 3.3. Sensitivity analyses concerning endogeneity (market-level model).* 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables Base No FFS 2006-07 2008-09 IV 
          
Benchmark 0.495*** 0.531*** 0.536*** 0.560*** 0.481*** 
 
(0.0546) (0.0515) (0.0986) (0.0629) (0.0782) 
Risk (FFS) -10.25 -8.732 30.63 -188.1** -10.17 
 
(16.43) (16.03) (18.33) (89.20) (10.09) 
Risk (Plan) -28.91 -27.86 -121.9*** 13.73 -27.95 
 
(22.15) (22.05) (36.69) (25.07) (19.99) 
FFS cost 0.0585  -0.0156 -0.000977 0.0641 
 
(0.0478)  (0.0877) (0.0530) (0.0516) 
Pop (1000s) -0.00835 -0.00404 -0.0732 0.0700 -0.00758 
 
(0.0362) (0.0377) (0.0757) (0.0434) (0.0121) 
Insurers -1.173*** -1.120*** -0.728* -2.427*** -1.172*** 
 
(0.285) (0.268) (0.425) (0.435) (0.183) 
  
     
Market FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y 
  
     
Constant 307.3*** 316.3*** 382.7*** 457.7***   
 
(45.96) (43.32) (76.99) (114.4)   
  
     
Observations 6,036 6,036 2,808 3,228 5,647 
R-squared 0.360 0.357 0.355 0.515 0.360 
Markets 2,013 2,013 1,659 1,809 1,624 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by state. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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3.6.4. Effect on rebates 
 
Since bids are directly related to rebates, the effect of benchmark changes on 
rebates follows mechanically from its effect on bids. For every dollar increase in 
benchmarks, I would expect bids and rebates to move in the same direction as long as the 
bid increases by less than a dollar. In other words, a dollar increase in benchmarks must 
translate into a dollar increase from the sum of changes in bids, rebates, and the amount 
of the 25 percent tax. I would expect the following identity to hold from the model’s 
estimates. 0.75(1 - ) = Δrebate. The results predict that a $1 increase in the benchmark 
would lead to a $0.38 increase in rebates. As a confirmatory analysis, the base model 
with rebates on the left-hand side produced an estimate of $0.34 (S.E. $0.04).  
 
3.7. Conclusion  
 
In this paper, I examine the competitive bidding system in MA, a relatively 
unstudied component of the MA program. I assessed the effect of benchmark changes on 
plan bids and rebates, showing that a $1 increase in benchmark leads to a $0.50 increase 
in bids among HMO plans. Given that the supply curve is likely very elastic, models of 
perfect competition predict that bids should be insensitive to changes in the benchmark 
.However, I demonstrate that bids consistently move with benchmarks even after 
controlling for actual FFS costs and both plan (MA) and FFS beneficiary risk. Sensitivity 
analyses and an instrumental variable approach using simulated benchmark updates 
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consistently produced similar estimates. To my knowledge, this is the first empirical 
study of the competitive bidding system in Medicare. 
Our results are consistent with several possible explanations. First, they are 
consistent with economic models of imperfect competition, in which insurers exercise 
their market power and use higher bids to boost profits at the expense of rebates to 
beneficiaries. Second, these findings are also consistent with providers exercising market 
power in their negotiations with insurers. Specifically, providers may observe (or 
anticipate) CMS increases in the benchmark rates and capture some of the increase 
through negotiating for higher fees from the commercial plans. I cannot precisely 
distinguish between these explanations.  
This study has several limitations. Importantly, I do not observe actual plan costs. 
While I control for contemporaneous FFS costs in the model, unobserved plan costs 
could be different. For example, the risk profile of MA beneficiaries may be different 
from that of FFS Medicare beneficiaries, and MA plans may indirectly select for healthier 
beneficiaries through benefit design, advertising, or other means (Brown et al., 2011; 
Newhouse, 1996). I attempt to address this concern by controlling for FFS beneficiary 
and MA plan enrollee risk.  
Our findings have potential implications for proposals to expand the role of 
competitive bidding in Medicare, such as the Ryan-Wyden plan and Domenici-Rivlin 
proposal. These results suggest that competitive bidding markets in MA are not perfectly 
competitive and may not drive plan bids down to plan costs. Thus, they may temper the 
projected savings of replacing Medicare with a bidding system (Feldman, Coulam, and 
Dowd, 2012). Other models of bidding, including those in which the benchmark is not 
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known in advance, may yield different results. As the debate over Medicare reform 
escalates, the design of market-based bidding mechanisms should be done with these 
cautions in mind.  
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3.9. Supporting Materials 
 
I repeat the analysis by adding LPPO plans to the sample, as well as among all 
plans by additionally including PFFS plans. In general, I find smaller effects with the 
inclusion of less managed plans. With LPPOs included, I find that bids increase $0.47 for 
every dollar increase in the benchmark (Section 3.9.1). Note that the number of markets 
increases. This is because in many (rural) counties, there can be a lack of HMO plans. 
Local PPOs and often private fee-for-service (PFFS) plans are serving such counties.  
With LPPOs and PFFS included, bids increase $0.34 for a dollar increase in the 
benchmark (Section 3.9.2). This suggests that PFFS plans may be more responsive to 
competition than HMO and LPPO plans, which is also consistent with the increasingly 
negative coefficients on “number of insurers” from the HMO-only sample (Table 3.1) to 
the sample with LPPO and PFFS plans included (Section 3.9.2). HMO, LPPO, and PFFS 
plans all compete with each other simultaneously, as they face the same benchmarks in 
all counties and enrollees are free to choose among them. Rural counties are more likely 
to have a dominance of PFFS plans, as HMO plans are largely confined to densely-
populated areas. 
 
  
Section 3.9.1.  
Table 3.4. Effect of benchmark on bids, market-level longitudinal model (HMO and local PPO plans).* 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES Base No risk 
No plan 
risk No FFS Linear year Unweighted 
Large 
markets Interactions HHI HHI*bench 
                      
Benchmark 0.466*** 0.464*** 0.456*** 0.525*** 0.536*** 0.420*** 0.488*** 0.567*** 0.441*** 0.501*** 
 
(0.0680) (0.0690) (0.0688) (0.0507) (0.0505) (0.0715) (0.0627) (0.0635) (0.0652) (0.0861) 
Risk (FFS) -14.37 
 
-17.72 -11.47 -34.45** 9.333 -17.09 -14.28 -12.70 -12.65 
 
(15.61) 
 
(16.81) (15.14) (14.97) (17.37) (15.97) (15.31) (15.72) (15.68) 
Risk (Plan) -41.04 -44.99* 
 
-35.21 -56.40** -51.00** -38.62 -45.25* -40.04 -38.93 
 
(24.58) (26.10) 
 
(25.83) (23.19) (20.26) (26.34) (24.08) (24.71) (24.39) 
FFS cost 0.0887* 0.0844* 0.0814* 
 
0.0742 0.141** 0.0725 0.106** 0.0900* 0.0875* 
 
(0.0474) (0.0466) (0.0476) 
 
(0.0465) (0.0553) (0.0469) (0.0509) (0.0453) (0.0443) 
Pop (1000s) 0.00770 0.00972 0.00749 0.0114 0.0131 0.0615 0.00214 0.0125 -0.0106 -0.0135 
 
(0.0447) (0.0451) (0.0443) (0.0466) (0.0460) (0.0420) (0.0446) (0.0446) (0.0491) (0.0481) 
Insurers -1.451*** -1.459*** -1.500*** -1.357*** -1.798*** -2.087*** -1.336*** 2.434 -1.287*** -1.312*** 
 
(0.307) (0.312) (0.299) (0.276) (0.342) (0.374) (0.300) (1.814) (0.333) (0.359) 
Insurers*Bench 
       
-0.00449**     
        
(0.00213)     
HHI (beds) 
       
  -0.00737** 0.0211 
        
  (0.00299) (0.0257) 
HHI*Bench 
       
  
 
-3.23e-05 
        
  
 
(2.70e-05) 
Market FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y 
 
Y Y Y Y Y 
Year (linear) 
    
3.505** 
  
      
     
(1.410) 
  
      
Constant 338.8*** 332.7*** 316.8*** 344.0*** -6,699** 327.2*** 330.2*** 243.1*** 371.2*** 319.2*** 
 
(43.91) (45.04) (44.61) (38.34) (2,829) (46.32) (41.12) (48.46) (43.62) (72.70) 
Observations 7,056 7,056 7,056 7,056 7,056 7,056 4,621 7,056 7,056 7,056 
R-squared 0.381 0.379 0.377 0.375 0.346 0.332 0.396 0.385 0.386 0.387 
Markets 2,231 2,231 2,231 2,231 2,231 2,231 1,484 2,231 2,231 2,231 
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Section 3.9.2.  
Table 3.5. Effect of benchmark on bids, market-level longitudinal model (HMO, local PPO, and PFFS plans).* 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES Base No risk 
No plan 
risk No FFS Linear year Unweighted 
Large 
markets Interactions HHI HHI*bench 
                      
Benchmark 0.338*** 0.334*** 0.344*** 0.513*** 0.629*** 0.329*** 0.362*** 0.389*** 0.338*** 0.285 
 
(0.0664) (0.0646) (0.0654) (0.0526) (0.0617) (0.0597) (0.0793) (0.0744) (0.0660) (0.178) 
Risk (FFS) -23.64* 
 
-20.61 -24.58 -28.90* -9.423 -32.10*** -23.23 -23.61 -23.92 
 
(14.06) 
 
(13.94) (16.69) (15.82) (10.69) (11.85) (14.23) (14.16) (14.39) 
Risk (Plan) 55.14 52.15 
 
71.80** 71.03** 57.72** 46.83 49.94 54.98 54.66 
 
(34.95) (33.92) 
 
(35.19) (34.01) (22.17) (52.78) (37.76) (35.27) (34.76) 
FFS cost 0.285*** 0.286*** 0.301*** 
 
0.107 0.350*** 0.217** 0.276*** 0.286*** 0.284*** 
 
(0.0750) (0.0731) (0.0707) 
 
(0.0679) (0.0656) (0.0902) (0.0750) (0.0756) (0.0772) 
Pop (1000s) -0.0468 -0.0429 -0.0440 -0.0256 -0.0249 0.0273 -0.0483 -0.0240 -0.0449 -0.0386 
 
(0.0835) (0.0784) (0.0833) (0.0815) (0.0977) (0.0603) (0.0858) (0.0976) (0.0867) (0.0853) 
Insurers -1.968*** -1.987*** -1.898*** -1.934*** -2.759*** -2.867*** -1.722** 1.802 -1.981*** -2.000*** 
 
(0.639) (0.620) (0.673) (0.658) (0.804) (0.531) (0.653) (4.516) (0.651) (0.634) 
Insurers*Bench 
       
-0.00456 
  
        
(0.00555) 
  HHI (beds) 
        
0.000819 -0.0205 
         
(0.00445) (0.0632) 
HHI*Bench 
         
2.59e-05 
          
(7.56e-05) 
Market FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y 
 
Y Y Y Y Y 
Year (linear) 
    
11.32*** 
  
      
     
(1.960) 
  
      
Constant 247.9*** 229.7*** 279.0*** 292.0*** -22,586*** 196.4*** 292.8*** 216.0*** 245.9*** 291.0* 
 
(58.05) (60.14) (48.60) (55.17) (3,919) (47.47) (79.46) (54.48) (54.96) (163.1) 
Observations 12,334 12,334 12,334 12,334 12,334 12,334 5,846 12,334 12,334 12,334 
R-squared 0.659 0.657 0.655 0.640 0.626 0.705 0.623 0.660 0.659 0.659 
Markets 3,106 3,106 3,106 3,106 3,106 3,106 1,473 3,106 3,106 3,106 
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